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DAMNED FOR THEIR JUDGMENT: THE TORT
LIABILITY OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATIONS
Robert H. Heidt*
INTRODUCTION
The National Spa and Pool Institute ("NSPI") was a private,
nonprofit trade association and standards development organization
for, among others, builders of swimming pools. Although NSPI
primarily provided a forum and information clearinghouse, it also
strove, through consensus surveys of its members and through other
methods, to develop suggested minimum standards for pools.'
Beyond ensuring that the standards were developed following the
procedures of the "Canvass Method" of the American National
Standards Institute ("ANSI"), NSPI did not follow with any effort to
check on compliance with the standards nor to sanction
noncompliance.
In order to suggest a standard, the NSPI members inevitably
confronted trade-offs between desirable but conflicting features of
pools. 3 Consider, for instance, the trade-offs inherent in the NSPI-
suggested standards for the depth and transition slope of what were
known in the industry as Type II pools.' These were commonplace
* B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin
Law School.
1. NSPI assigned the initial draft of its standards to the relevant
subcommittee, here the Aboveground/Onground Residential Pool
Subcommittee, which it thereafter referred to as the "Writing Committee."
That committee then used the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI")
Canvass Method to develop consensus on an ultimate draft. The ANSI Canvass
Method is described infra in text accompanying notes 139-45.
2. The pools are typically built and installed on site by local construction
companies, many of which specialize in pools and spas. When injuries occur in
the pools, these local builders and sellers, along with other product suppliers,
face potential products liability. But the liability insurance policies of these
local businesses may offer plaintiffs only modest liability limits.
3. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in
the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56
TEx. L. REV. 1329, 1378 (1978) ("Decisions affecting health and safety require
tradeoffs between increased safety or health considerations on the one hand and
increased costs and inconvenience on the other. . . .").
4. See AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD FOR
RESIDENTIAL INGROUND SwIMMING PooLs ANSI/NSPI-5, at para. 5.10.1 (2003),
available at http://divingboardsafety.net/Standard-inground-pools.pdf.
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residential pools that typically included a one-meter diving board at
the deep end. To suggest a standard for the depth and transition
slope of such pools, NSPI needed to balance such features as
durability, maintenance, cost, and the appeal to, and safety of, pool
users. Optimum safety itself required further trade-offs. Too little
depth and too abrupt a transition slope increased the collision risk
to those using the diving board. Too much depth and too gradual a
transition slope increased the drowning risk to all pool users.
The NSPI members derived no direct financial benefit from
confronting these inevitable trade-offs.' NSPI dues were not fees
creating a contract that called for NSPI to suggest standards.!
Although their participation in NSPI no doubt furthered the
business interests of their employers, the NSPI members were
volunteers, ostensibly serving out of a sense of responsibility rather
than financial gain. Yet the standards that emerged from NSPI's
judgment represented the distillation and encapsulation of
invaluable engineering, technological, and scientific learning gained
from the members' collective experience. Like those of other
standards development organizations ("standard developers"), the
NSPI standards lowered the search costs and assisted the entry of
aspiring builders of pools into the industry, thereby reducing
information asymmetries and fostering desirable competition, as
well as greatly improving the odds that the occasional "do-it-
yourselfer" would construct a pool that was reasonably safe. The
development of product standards also typically allows the
interchangeability of parts (especially replacement parts), increases
industrial innovation, identifies possible goals the products can
serve, avoids the burdens of government regulation, supports
common industry values, and facilitates benchmarking.'
5. See Meyers v. Donnatacci, 531 A.2d 398, 405-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1987); James A. Filkins, Snyder v. American Association of Blood Banks:
Balancing Duties and Immunities in Assessing the Third Party Liability of Non-
Profit Medical Associations, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 243, 254 (2000).
6. See Meyers, 531 A.2d at 405-06.
7. See id. at 406. See FTC Standards and Certification, 43 Fed. Reg.
57,269, 57,269 (proposed Dec. 7, 1978) (describing the many benefits of private
standards development); GEORGE P. LAMB & CARRINGTON SHIELDS, TRADE
ASSOCIATION LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 5.1-.5 (rev. ed. 1971) (same); G. WEBSTER,
THE LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS §§ 19.01, 19-2 to -3 (rev. ed. 1981) (same); Hamilton,
supra note 3, at 1377-79 (same). Congress most recently recognized the social
value of standards development in 2004 when it passed the Standards
Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306
(2006). Nevertheless, U.S. courts have been willing to impute socially
undesirable motives to standards development organizations. See infra text
accompanying note 128.
8. See Standards and Certification, 43 Fed. Reg. at 57,269 (listing some of
the benefits of standard development). Benchmarking is a process in which a
company learns the practices and mimics the techniques of its superior-
performing peers in order to enhance its own efficiency. See David J. Teece,
Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 465, 477-78
1228 [Vol. 45
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Particularly in the fields of communications and information
technology, which rely heavily on networking and interoperability,
technical compatibility standards play a vital role in allowing
innovators to commercialize new products.! The information
encapsulated in a standard is a public good; unless the legal
environment provides appropriate incentives for private standard
developers to produce that information, not enough will be
produced.'o
The government also sets standards when it regulates products.
And unlike the suggested standards of private standard developers,
government standards are often mandatory." In setting their
(1994).
Because the advantages of complying with a suggested standard are often
significant, a business may not experience compliance as voluntary. A business
may feel especially coerced to comply when noncompliance threatens some form
of accreditation. Id. at 475-77. But coercion that is driven by the wish to take
advantage of economies-which may be available either at the firm or industry
level-cannot be equated with the coercion of government regulation without
robbing the term "coercion" of too much of its value. In any event, the less
compliance appears to be voluntary, the more quasi-governmental the standard
developer becomes, the better it can wrap itself in the government's immunity,
and the stronger the case becomes for according it the qualified privilege from
tort liability for which this Article contends.
9. Id. at 477-78. For a perspective on the role that standard development
plays in these markets, where it also helps new entrants "hack [their] way
through [the patent thicket]," see Jonathan L. Rubin, Patents, Antitrust, and
Rivalry in Standard-Setting, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 509, 509 (2007) (quoting Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)).
10. As Professor Daniel Farber writes, "[Tihe presumption should be that
the free dissemination of information generally makes individuals more
knowledgeable and improves their welfare." Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech
Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REV.
554, 560 (1991). "Requiring producers [of information] to internalize costs
fully.. . will not lead to a socially optimal level of information production
because producers cannot also internalize all the benefits of their enterprise.
Hence, information activities should not be subject to full tort liability." Id. at
559 n.22.
11. Because the NSPI membership included competing builders, these
members and the NSPI would face antitrust exposure were they to reach
agreement on the actual characteristics of the products each member would
offer. See, e.g., Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n. v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 427 (7th Cir.
1965) (holding that an agreement on product content violates § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act). The 2004 Act did not immunize from antitrust
exposure standard developers who participate in such agreements. See 15
U.S.C. § 4301(c)(3) (2006).
This Article does not address the antitrust concerns that would arise from
such agreements. Nor does it address the antitrust concerns that would arise if
a standard developer attempted to sanction noncompliance with its standards.
The Article further assumes that the standard developer's agreement on
suggested standards does not disguise a coordinated effort to reduce output.
This last assumption can be indulged confidently because coordinated efforts to
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standards, government regulators confront the same trade-offs of
conflicting considerations that private standard developers confront.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), for example,
adopts standards for products after much investigation of the costs
and benefits of proposed precautions and in so doing must confront
such trade-offs as follows: "how much certain risks should be
tolerated to reduce others"; "how much should other interests, such
as the range of consumer choice, be sacrificed in the interest of
safety"; "how much weight should be given to the possibility that
drunks and children may use the product for other than its intended
purposes"; and ultimately "how much safety is enough."12 Like the
decision of when to evacuate a city as a storm approaches, such
policy-bound trade-offs undertaken by the government represent an
exercise of discretionary judgment, universally deemed
inappropriate for independent judicial review." When the CPSC
uses its best judgment to undertake these trade-offs and thereby set
a product standard, it need not fear that a judge and jury will
second-guess its judgment, deem it negligent for adopting its
standard, pronounce that negligence to be a cause of injuries
suffered by those using a complying product, and hold it liable in
tort for those injuries.
Despite their standards being only suggestive, 4 NSPI and other
reduce output require agreement by senior management on variables not
normally part of standards development.
The antitrust implications of standards development were exhaustively
examined by the Federal Trade Commission from 1974 through 1985. See, e.g.,
Standards and Certification, 43 Fed. Reg. at 57,269, 57,269 (proposed Dec. 7,
1978) (stating that one of the FTC's concerns was the "denial to consumers of
the benefits of superior or lower cost"); U.S. FTC, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 15-16
(1985), available at http://ftc.gov/os/annualreports/arl985.pdf. The FTC
considered a wide range of concerns about standard development, not merely a
concern about reduced output. See Standards and Certification, 43 Fed. Reg. at
57,269-84. One concern was that the developer's wish to further the business
interests of its most influential members would lead to standards that were not
congruent with consumer interests, either being too low out of a wish to reduce
the member's costs, or too high out of a wish to disadvantage lower-cost rivals
or entrants whose products did not comply. See id. at 57,270-71. Other
concerns included the lack of public accountability of standard developers and
the possibility that small or innovative firms would lack sufficient input in the
standard-development process. See id. at 57,269-71. Various proposed rules
were considered but none were adopted. See id. at 57,271; U.S. FTC, 1985
ANNUAL REPORT 16, supra (terminating the investigation in 1985 without any
action having been taken).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (2006) (establishing the CPSC).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006) (defining the discretionary-function
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act); Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d
326, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2009) (barring suits against the government based on its
allegedly negligent response to Hurricane Katrina based on the discretionary
function of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act).
14. This Article does not deal with standards that are backed by the force of
1230 [Vol. 45
DAMNED FOR THEIR JUDGMENT
private standard developers enjoy no such luxury. Pool users who
collide with the bottoms of pools meeting NSPI suggested standards
have successfully obtained tort awards against NSPI in excess of
seven figures.'" The basis for these awards is simply that NSPI
negligently undertook the trade-offs it faced. For example, juries
have found NSPI negligent on the ground that its suggested
standards for a Type II pool allowed too little depth and too abrupt a
transition slope.' 6 The courts in these cases simply invited the
juries to second-guess the NSPI trade-offs that were incorporated in
the suggested standards. 7  Having deemed negligent NSPI's
government, even though the standards may have emerged from a private
standard developer. Nor does it deal with standards that yield "audited self-
regulation." Audited self-regulation occurs when the government delegates the
power to enforce and create standards to a nongovernmental body but retains
the power to review those standards through a federal agency. See Douglas C.
Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 174-77 (1995).
15. E.g., Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 53, 60 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (affirming a jury verdict against NSPI for negligence in suggesting
standards and upholding a total damages award of $11 million against multiple
defendants, $6.6 million of which was assessed against NSPI). After the
Meneely judgment, NSPI filed for bankruptcy. See In re Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst.,
257 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001). After briefly emerging from bankruptcy in
March of 2000, NSPI filed again for bankruptcy in that summer. Kenneth
Bredemeier, Rules or Advice?; Pool-Safety Cases Target Trade Group, WASH.
POST, Nov. 11, 2002, at El. By the fall of 2002, NSPI faced more than $50
million in tort damages. Jerald A. Jacobs, Dodging the Liability Bullet:
Preventing Tort Claims Resulting from Association Policies and Programs,
PILLSBURY LAW: PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS (Sept. 2003),
http://www.pillsburylaw.conmindex.cfm?pageid=34&itemid=37386. NSPI
emerged from bankruptcy in 2004, reorganized as the Association of Pool and
Spa Professionals ("APSP"). See APSP Profile, ASS'N POOL & SPA PROFS.,
http://www.apsp.org/Public/AboutUs/APSPProfile/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 4,
2010). It then created a new organization, the International Aquatics
Foundation ("IAF"), specifically for standards development. Bob Dumas, NSPI
Emerges from Bankruptcy, SPA & POOL NEWS, Nov. 19, 2004,
http://poolspanews.com/20041112/112topnews.html. NSPI's need to file
bankruptcy suggests the difficulty that standard developers face in purchasing
adequate liability insurance. Association liability insurance policies ("ALIPs"),
sometimes called Association Professional Liability Insurance policies
("APLIs"), do not cover claims for "bodily injury or property damage."
16. Meneely, 5 P.3d at 59-60. The court in Meneely acknowledged that
expert testimony indicated a Type II pool would need to be over twenty-two feet
deep in order to eliminate completely the risk that a person using a one-meter
diving board would collide with the pool's bottom. Id. at 59. Such depth would
significantly increase the risk to all pool users of drowning and would also
increase the cost of construction and maintenance. Moreover, the
overwhelming majority of pool users do not need nearly that depth to slow their
descent after diving, or to otherwise protect themselves against contacting the
pool's bottom. See id.
17. See, e.g., id. at 60 (holding that "the evidence and the reasonable
inferences [drawn] therefrom support the jury's findings that NSPI negligently
caused [plaintiffs] injuries").
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judgment about these trade-offs, these juries went on to find that
negligence was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the collision
injury of the plaintiff pool users.' Naturally, these juries, and the
courts upholding their decisions, were never required to confront nor
defend the increased drowning risk that would accompany the
greater depth or more gradual transition slope they implicitly
required. Indeed, a future jury in the case of a plaintiff who
drowned would be free to deem NSPI negligent because its
standards suggested a depth that was too great or a transition slope
that was too gradual. To add insult to injury, the Final Draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm repeatedly cites with approval one of the appellate court
opinions that subjects NSPI to a significant risk of tort liability
whenever a person is injured in a pool that complies with NSPI
standards. '
Granted, U.S. product liability law for at least the past five
decades has asked juries to second-guess similar trade-offs made by
companies that design products. When a jury applies the risk-
utility test to the claim that a manufacturer's conscious choice of
design was defective, for example, the jury is asked whether the
plaintiffs proposed alternative design, which typically reduces the
risk that caused plaintiffs injury while increasing either costs or
other risks, renders the defendant's actual design not reasonably
safe and hence defective.20 In effect, then, the jury is asked whether
the defendant's trade-off unduly tolerated the risk that materialized
in the plaintiffs injury in order to serve other interests or to reduce
other risks. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp. is a classic example. 2' The
jury deemed the car that General Motors manufactured defective in
its design because General Motors opted for a relatively light side
bar that did not extend all the way through the front door panel.2 2
The jury found that the plaintiff-driver's alternative design, which
included a larger and longer side bar, rendered defendant's design
defective. The jury also found that this alternative design would
have probably reduced the injury to the plaintiff-driver when his car
skidded sideways and wrapped around a telephone pole. 24  But
although the larger and longer side bar would have reduced injuries
in side collisions, the evidence showed that the side bar called for by
the jury would have added rigidity to the car and therefore would
18. Id. at 58-59.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 43 cmts. c, e (Proposed Final Draft 2005) (citing with approval King v.
National Spa & Pool Institute, 570 So. 2d 612 (Ala. 1990)).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
21. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
22. Id. at 958-59.
23. Id. at 954-55.
24. Id.
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have increased injuries in a frontal collision. 25 Hence a later jury in
a frontal-collision case could deem a car's design defective precisely
because it included the larger and longer side bar. In designing its
car, General Motors simply could not avoid trading off these risks
and also trading off other pros and cons of the larger and longer
sidebar, which included on the con side all the disadvantages of the
added weight and added costs. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the verdict for the plaintiff-driver but expressed severe
misgivings about asking juries to second-guess the trade-offs that
underlay a manufacturer's conscious design decisions.
Many commentators, as well as an occasional court, have
denounced this feature of our products liability law.2 ' These critics
point out that juries undertake these trade-offs with much less
information than the product manufacturers (or than the
government regulators), including, in particular, information about
the wishes of consumers. 28 Juries also undertake the trade-offs with
much less time to reflect.29  In addition, juries undertake these
trade-offs with the often tragically injured plaintiff before them and
in the conspicuous absence of the consumers whom defendant's
design saved. This setting invites the jury, erroneously, to view the
product and its risks ex post (i.e., with the benefit of hindsight) and
to assign undue weight to the risk that materialized in the plaintiffs
injury compared to the risks that the defendant's design reduced."0
The contradictory mandates that are invited-whereby the
defendant's trade-off is condemned by some juries for overweighting
a certain risk and by other juries for underweighting that same
risk-disgrace our jurisprudence much more than would mere
conflicting verdicts. Telling a manufacturer that it is negligent if it
adopts a certain design and also negligent if it rejects that design
sends a more perverse signal than merely having juries disagree
25. Id. at 958-59.
26. Id. at 962-63.
27. See, e.g., Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215-17 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and
Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
Ky. L.J. 1, 89 (1986); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
CoLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1531 (1973); Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and
Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL.
L. REv. 133, 152-53 (1982); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 116 (2001).
28. Viscusi, supra note 27, at 116-17.
29. See, e.g., Carroll, 896 F.2d at 216 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("The
costs of adequate data often exceed the stakes of the case. Worse, many cases
go to judgment before the data can be gathered and analyzed.").
30. For a discussion of a recent opinion from the Supreme Court of the
United States acknowledging the inferiority of the jury, compared to legislators
or administrators, in undertaking the balancing of necessary trade-offs, see
infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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about whether a manufacturer's design is defective. Two juries
disagreeing on the Dawson facts about whether General Motors'
design was defective merely shows that our decision-making system
is not fully predictable. Two juries both condemning General
Motors' design-one for overweighting a certain risk and the other
for underweighting that same risk-shows that our decision-making
system, although predictable, is an intellectual disgrace. The
shortcomings of asking juries to second-guess the conscious trade-
offs of product designers argue against extending this aspect of our
products liability law to standard developers.
Asking the jury to second-guess the far more informed and
carefully arrived-at judgment of the standard developer is not the
only disturbing feature of imposing liability on "negligent" standard
developers whenever a person is injured by a product conforming to
the developer's standards. The intervening behavior of the product's
builder will often be more culpable than that of the standard
developer, raising the fear that the suit against the standard
developer represents the plaintiffs opportunistic pursuit of a
marginal contributor." While tort law has been notoriously willing
to countenance the pursuit of marginal contributors,12 doing so risks
creating an undesirable distance between tort law and popular
views of moral culpability.
Moreover, even when the product conforms to the standards of
the standard developer, the testimony of the builder that he relied
on those standards (rather than on his own judgment) in
constructing the product is unreliable. Blaming the standard
developer is a costless option for the builder. Deflecting blame to
the standard developer mitigates the builder's culpability. The
plaintiffs family or attorney may have urged the builder to point his
finger at the standard developer. Nor is the testimony of the builder
that he relied on the standards in constructing the product the kind
of evidence whose dependability can be adequately checked through
cross-examination. Yet this undependable testimony will often
31. A plaintiffs option to sue the builder or seller of the product, service, or
activity that conformed to the standard also gives the injured plaintiff an
alternative to suing the standard developer. These products liability suits
against the builder or seller give the court and jury a more concrete product,
service, or activity to evaluate than does the relatively abstract standard.
Thanks to the rule of The T.J. Hooper, the builder's or seller's compliance with
the industry standard gives it no defense in these suits. See New Eng. Coal &
Coke Co. v. N. Barge Corp. (The T.J. Hooper), 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
A pattern of successful suits against these industry members should provide at
least some deterrence against an industry standard developer acting
irresponsibly. Further deterrence is provided by the FTC's ability to attack
standards it deems "deceptive." See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
32. See George Scott Christian & Dale Craymer, Texas Asbestos Litigation
Reform: A Model for the States, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 981, 997 (2003) (discussing
joint and several liability for asbestos distributors that are only marginally
culpable for asbestos-related injuries).
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provide the only evidence establishing not one, but two elements of
the prima facie case against the standard developer. This testimony
will establish the reliance on which many courts will base the
standard developer's tort duty. 3 And this same testimony will
supply the cause-in-fact connection between the standard and the
plaintiffs injury. Showing the cause-in-fact connection, after all,
requires showing that but for the standard, the builder would have
made the product differently, and the plaintiffs injury would
probably have been avoided. Hence two of the three major
issues-the other being the negligence ("breach") issue-turn on
little more than speculation by a biased party.
Still more disturbing is the high percentage of cases against
standard developers like NSPI in which the plaintiffs injuries, being
horrific, call for damages of seven or more figures. This is no
coincidence, because plaintiffs with lesser injuries will likely find
the builder's or seller's liability insurance limits adequate for their
purposes and feel less need to chase the national or international
standard developer. Consequently, the severity of the plaintiffs
injuries combined with the status of the national or international
standard developer exacerbates the usual threat that jury sympathy
for the plaintiff will overthrow the requirement of causal negligence
as the foundation for liability. In deciding the breach issue, for
example, the jury will need to balance the brutally tangible tragedy
the plaintiff has suffered against the more abstract benefits of the
33. The duty of the standard developer to the injured plaintiff is typically
imposed by invoking section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the
voluntary rescue doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(c)
(1965). See, e.g., King v. Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 570 So. 2d 612, 614 (Ala.
1990) (noting that NSPI had a duty to plaintiff based on the voluntary rescue
doctrine and section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); French v.
Chase, 297 P.2d 235, 238 (Wash. 1956) (explaining that while an actor may not
have an affirmative duty to rescue, if he undertakes a rescue effort, he must use
a reasonable degree of care in carrying out that rescue). Both of these grounds
for imposing a duty require reliance by a third party-here, the builder or
seller-on the standard to the detriment of the plaintiff who used the product.
See id.
34. The difficult problems of proof in determining cause-in-fact are
themselves a recognized reason for dismissing the cases that present these
proof problems on the ground of "no duty." The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm provides this example:
In the educational-malpractice area, courts have concluded that
educators have no duty of care to their students, often because of the
administrative difficulties of adjudicating such claims. Problems exist
both in sorting out conduct that is innovative or nontraditional as
opposed to negligent and in determining the factual cause of a
student's educational deficiency.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM§ 7
cmt. f (2010).
35. Ignoring globalization and the international character of modern
standard development, this Article restricts itself to the liability of standard
developers under the tort law of the various jurisdictions of the United States.
2010] 1235
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standard.
Another disturbing feature is that the standard that the
defendant organization suggests-while appearing to be a simple
statement of how a product should be made or designed (in the case
of prescriptive or design standards) or how a product should perform
(in the case of performance standards)-may not only convey
information. Some standards also constitute an opinion that a
product so made or so performing is reasonably safe and represents
an effective net of all trade-offs. Seeing suggested standards as
opinions carries two implications. First, it brings into relief the
extent to which standards represent an exercise in discretionary
judgment. Hence some of the same concerns that warrant a
complete privilege from tort liability for discretionary judgments of
other decision makers call for at least a qualified privilege for those
who develop standards. Otherwise liability for negligence will
continue to threaten to distort the judgment of standard developers,
just as such liability would threaten to distort the discretionary
judgment of now-privileged decision makers." Second, insofar as
standards represent opinions, they are best forged through fearless
and robust discussion among the members of the standard
developer, unhampered by concerns of tort exposure. Liability then,
perhaps to a surprising extent, also implicates First Amendment
values. Finally, imposing liability on standard developers
whenever a person is injured by a product conforming to their
standards and a jury deems the standard developer negligent
exposes these organizations to an amount of liability that is unduly
open-ended, insufficiently limited," and disproportionate to the
36. For amplification of this point, see infra Part V.
37. Citing First Amendment values, courts have refused to impose a tort
duty of care on the authors and sellers of "how to" books. See, e.g., Cardozo v.
True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a book
retailer was not liable to a customer on the basis of a recipe in a cookbook that
led to plaintiffs poisoning, and observing that "ideas hold a privileged position
in our society"); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (holding that there could be no cause of action for negligence
against the publisher of a "how to" book on making tools and observing that
"[a]ny action which limits free expression must be scrutinized for potential
infringement of the public right of free access to ideas"); Walter v. Bauer, 439
N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that the publisher of a science
book was not liable to a plaintiff who was injured while conducting an
experiment described in the book and concluding that "the danger of plaintiffs
proposed theory is the chilling effect it would have on the First Amendment").
Yet many standards also describe "how to" produce a product or perform a
service or activity, and hence equally implicate First Amendment values.
38. More precisely, the judicial concern is with insufficiently limited
liability for a single tortious act. This differs from "mass tort liability"
situations, which raise different problems. For discussion of the many areas of
tort law affected expressly or implicitly by the judicial concern with
insufficiently limited liability, see generally Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for
Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513
1236 [Vol. 45
DAMNED FOR THEIR JUDGMENT
modest benefits the organization receives.
The number and variety of standards development
organizations underscore the social importance of this Article. The
ANSI reports that as of 1996, about 700 organizations were
promulgating more than 93,000 standards." Juries have been
allowed to second-guess suggested standards ranging from the
American Association of Blood Banks' protocols for screening blood
donors"o to the Oregon School Activity Association's schedules for
starting football practice.4  Practice parameters routinely and
laboriously issued for nearly every medical treatment threaten to
expose the medical associations that issue them to significant tort
liability.43 When this liability drives small standard developers like
(1985). If negligent standard development were to lead to class actions against
the standard developers, the insufficient limit on liability would present itself
even more forcefully.
39. See Domestic Programs (American National Standards) Overview, AM.
NAT'L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/standardsactivities/domestic
programs/overview.aspx?menuid=3 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). In 1985, the
Department of Defense mentioned around 3300 private standards in its
procurement documents. James C. Miller, The FTC and Voluntary Standards:
Maximizing the Net Benefits of Self-Regulation, 4 CATO J. 897, 899 (1985). The
Internal Revenue Service reported in 2002 that over 71,000 organizations were
registered under § 501(c)(6) of the tax code as nonprofit business leagues, the
category in which standard developers typically fall. JOHN FRANCIS REILLY ET
AL., IRS, IRC 501(c)(6) ORGANIZATIONS, at K-1, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
40. Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks (Snyder II), 676 A.2d 1036, 1038,
1055 (N.J. 1996) (upholding a jury verdict for a plaintiff who received HIV-
infected blood against a standard developer for blood banks).
41. Peterson v. Multnomah Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 668 P.2d 385, 388, 393
(Or. Ct. App. 1983) (finding an association to be liable to a paralyzed plaintiff
because its standards for preseason football allowed live tackling at early
practices); see also Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Am. Plywood Ass'n, No.
932026, 1994 WL 463527, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 1994) (holding that, by
developing standards for the use of plywood, the American Plywood Association
subjected itself to liability to homeowners whose property was damaged by a
hurricane).
42. Practice parameters, or practice guidelines, are defined by the Institute
of Medicine as "systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and
patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances." Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 370 (1995) (quoting INST. OF MED.,
CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8 (Marilyn J.
Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990)). See generally Alice Nobel et al., Snyder
v. American Association of Blood Banks: A Re-examination of Liability for
Medical Practice Guideline Promulgators, 4 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 49
(1998); Megan L. Sheetz, Note, Toward Controlled Clinical Care Through
Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Legal Liability for Developers and Issuers of
Clinical Pathways, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1341 (1997).
43. In transplantation medicine, the physicians responsible for the
standards by which organs may be harvested could ultimately be held liable if a
donated organ has been inadequately screened or a potential recipient has been
denied an organ. See S. Sandy Sanbar, Organ Donation and Transplantation,
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NSPI into bankruptcy, the liability generates little public outcry.
That may not be true when the same legal principles endanger more
prominent organizations, like the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO")."
At least one possible effect of imposing liability on standard
developers has apparently not yet materialized-an attempt by a
successful plaintiff to collect a judgment against a standard
developer from its individual or corporate members who participated
in developing the standard. Principles of agency law arising from
other contexts would offer disturbingly strong support to such an
attempt. Yet such liability might well discourage individuals and
corporations from volunteering to develop standards.
This Article contends that when those injured by products,
services, or activities that conform with the standards of a private
standards development organization sue the organization for
negligence in suggesting its standards, a court should dismiss the
case on the ground of "no duty" 46 or should grant the organization a
in LEGAL MEDICINE 209, 218 (7th ed. 2007). In reproduction medicine, the
Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association has set
standards for referring a patient to a specialist in genetic counseling and may
face liability whenever doctors following their standards fail to refer a patient.
See Michael S. Cardwell & Thomas G. Kirkhope, Reproduction Patients, in Am.
COLL. OF LEGAL MED., LEGAL MEDICINE 380, 380 (Susie Baxter ed., 4th ed. 1998).
44. The JCAHO was formerly known as the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals. See Kimberly J. Todd, Note, Snyder v. American
Association of Blood Banks: Expansion of Trade Association Liability-Does It
Reach Medical Societies?, 29 U. TOL. L. REv. 149, 173 n.172 (1997) (discussing
the substantial exposure facing the JCAHO); Jack Bierig et al., Tort Liability
Considerations for Medical Societies, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE
PARAMETERS 43, 43-54 (1990) (same).
45. See, e.g., Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F.
Supp. 118, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[Wlhere a member knows or should know that
the [trade association] to which he belongs is engaged in an unlawful enterprise
and he continues his membership without protest, he may be found to have
ratified the organization's action and become unable subsequently to
disassociate himself from responsibility for its results.").
46. Whether a tort duty of care exists is a question of law. DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 149, at 355 (2000). The various tests for duty acknowledge
that resolving the duty issue requires balancing policy reasons for limiting the
responsibility of defendants who have committed a tortious act against policy
reasons for entitling a plaintiff to redress for injury caused by defendants'
tortious acts. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 53,
at 359 (W. Page Keeton ed., 4th ed. 1984) (noting various policy factors used in
determining the scope of duty, "including convenience of administration,
capacity of the parties to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future injuries,
[and] the moral blame attached to the wrongdoer"). Tests for duty also
acknowledge the wide latitude afforded to courts and cite as factors in
determining duty the relationship of the parties and the wish to avoid
potentially unlimited liability. The New York statement of the test for duty is
typical: "[Ilt is ... the responsibility of courts, in fixing the orbit of duty, 'to
limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree'. . .and to protect
against crushing exposure to liability. . . ." Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482
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qualified privilege." A qualified privilege would enable a standards
development organization to prevail on a pre-answer motion to
dismiss absent allegations in the injured plaintiffs complaint that
the organization suggested its standards in bad faith. Likewise, if
bad faith is alleged, a standards development organization should
prevail on summary judgment when the paper record fails to show
that the organization's good faith in suggesting its standards is
genuinely disputed. Whichever ground is chosen, a standard
developer should not be pushed to trial merely on a showing that the
plaintiff was injured by a product, service, or activity that conformed
to the standards combined with allegations that the standard
developer's suggestion of those standards was negligent .
I. THE CURRENT LAW ON THE DUTY ISSUE
Two cases presenting similar facts illustrate the tort exposure
facing standard developers. In King v. National Spa and Pool
Institute, Inc., the plaintiffs decedent broke his neck when he dove
off his diving board into his Type II pool. 49 Besides suing the local
company that built the pool, the plaintiff also sued NSPI, despite the
absence of any dealings between NSPI and the decedent, or even
any dealings between NSPI and the pool's builder, apart from the
pool builder's learning of the NSPI standards."o The plaintiffs sole
theory of liability against NSPI was, in the words of the Alabama
Supreme Court, "that the standards that allowed the placement of a
diving board in this particular size pool created an unreasonable
risk of harm."" That is, plaintiffs sole theory was that NSPI was
negligent for developing the particular standards that permitted a
diving board in plaintiffs type of pool. In reversing a grant of
summary judgment for NSPI, the court held that the plaintiff should
N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985) (citations omitted) (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 249
N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969)).
In every case discussed here, this Article assumes that the elements other
than duty have been resolved in the plaintiffs favor. In particular, the Article
refrains from discussing the merits of the particular standards suggested, for
the merits of those standards constitute the heart of the breach issue. This
Article abides by the sharp separation between the issues of duty and of breach
that the Restatement (Third): Liability for Physical and Emotional Injury
recommends. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. i (2010). For a discussion of proximate cause in these
cases, see infra note 52.
47. To assure that a plaintiff must produce evidence of bad faith to survive
a summary judgment motion, recognition of a qualified privilege should
probably be seen to establish "bad faith" as an additional element of plaintiffs
prima facie case rather than to establish "good faith" as a defense.
48. Nothing proposed here would affect the liability of the builders or
sellers of the injurious product, service, or activity.
49. King v. Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 570 So. 2d 612, 613, 615 (Ala. 1990).
50. Id. at 614.
51. Id. at 613.
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reach the jury and prevail if it could show that NSPI was negligent
"in promulgating the standards in question.""
To impose on NSPI the legal duty of ordinary care, the court
likened NSPI to a stranger who passes by another in distress. The
court acknowledged that NSPI "had no statutorily or judicially
imposed duty to formulate standards." But having suggested
standards, NSPI took on a legal duty to use ordinary care in doing
so.54 The court seized on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
324A." That section creates one of a number of exceptions to the
usual rule (often called the "no duty to rescue rule") that a stranger
passing by another owes the other no legal duty to act, carefully or
52. Id. at 616. The opinion clarified that NSPI's negligence arose from the
deficiencies in the particular standard it suggested rather than merely from
NSPI's decision to suggest standards in the first place. Id. at 618.
Of course the plaintiff must still show that NSPI's negligence in suggesting
its standards was a cause-in-fact and a proximate or a legal cause of his injury.
To show cause-in-fact, the plaintiff must show that "but for" the NSPI's
negligent suggestion of standards, the injury to the plaintiff would have
probably been avoided. DOBBS, supra note 46, § 168, at 409. The showing
needed to establish proximate or legal cause, or what the Restatement (Third)
refers to as the "scope of liability," is less clear. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. b (2010). But as long
as the defendant's standards are deemed negligent for ignoring or
underestimating the same risk that materialized in the plaintiff's injury,
proximate cause should exist. According to the Restatement (Third), "An actor's
liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the
actor's conduct tortious." Id. § 29. This risk test, as the Restatement (Third)
reporters explain, is congruent with the foreseeability test when the
foreseeability test is "properly understood and framed." Id. § 29 cmt. e.
The overlap between the duty issue and the proximate or legal cause issue
is well known, and the policy reasons for holding "no duty" will constitute the
ground for some courts holding "no proximate or legal cause." Id. § 29 cmt. f.
For a case holding that a standard was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff-
user's injury, see Sizemore v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., Nos. 6:94-2894-3, 6:94-
2895-3, 6:94-2896-3, 1996 WL 498410, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 1996), aff'd, 114
F.3d 1177 (4th Cir. 1997). In calling for a holding of "no duty" and in ignoring
the issue of proximate or legal cause, this Article follows the approach of the
Restatement (Third): Liability for Physical or Emotional Harm. Comment f to
section 29 of the Restatement (Third) states:
[Diuty is a preferable means for addressing limits on liability when
those limitations are clear, when they are based on relatively bright
lines, when they are of general application, when they do not usually
require resort to disputed facts in a case, when they implicate policy
concerns that apply to a class of cases that may not be fully
appreciated by a jury deciding a specific case, and when they are
employed in cases in which early resolution of liability is particularly
desirable.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. f (2010). Suits against standard developers by those claiming injury from
complying products or activities fit this criteria.
53. King, 570 So. 2d at 614.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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otherwise, to aid him.56 In general, section 324A imposes a duty of
care on a defendant toward a plaintiff when a defendant undertakes
to perform services for another that defendant should recognize are
necessary for the protection not of the other, but of a third party who
is the plaintiff. One of the most famous illustrations of section 324A
is Marsalis v. LaSalle, in which liability was imposed upon a
defendant-volunteer who promised a husband whose wife was bitten
by a cat to keep control of the cat until the passage of time would
reveal whether or not the cat was rabid." Were the cat to escape
before that time lapsed, the risk that the cat was rabid would cause
the plaintiff-wife to undergo painful medical treatment.58 When the
cat escaped due to the volunteer's negligence in confining it, and the
plaintiff underwent the medical treatment as a result, the principle
underlying section 324A enabled the plaintiff to recover from the
volunteer for the damages resulting from the wife's medical
treatment.59 Without this principle, the defendant-volunteer would
have been able to avoid liability by invoking the usual "no duty to
rescue rule," which is perhaps more precisely stated as the rule that
one has no duty to act affirmatively to aid another. Restatement
(Second) section 324A states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protecting his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the
risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or
the third person upon the undertaking.o
As the court saw the facts of King, NSPI, by suggesting
standards for pool construction, became the counterpart of the
volunteer in Marsalis. Suggesting its standards constituted an
undertaking by NSPI to render services to the pool builder, the
counterpart of the husband in Marsalis. In rendering those services
to the builder, NSPI should have recognized that the standards were
necessary for the protection of all users of pools that conformed to
NSPI standards, all such pool users-including the decedent, being
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
57. Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94 So. 2d 120, 122, 126 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
58. Id. at 122-23.
59. Id. at 126.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
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the counterpart of the plaintiff-wife in Marsalis. Hence, when NSPI
suggested standards to the pool builder, NSPI undertook to perform
the duty to use care, which the pool builder plainly owed to his
customer and to future users of that pool. On this reasoning,
324A(b) would apply and would impose a tort duty on NSPI to the
decedent and to any such pool user without the need for any further
evidence from plaintiff on remand. In addition, the harm to the pool
user was allegedly suffered because of the reliance of the pool
builder on NSPI's standards in building the pool. Therefore, section
324A(c) would also apply and would alternatively impose a tort duty
on NSPI to the decedent and to all pool users, at least once the
plaintiff on remand adduced some evidence that the builder relied
on NSPI standards." And for this purpose, the testimony of the
builder that he relied on NSPI standards in building the pool would
presumably suffice.6 2
61. Id. at 614.
62. Some courts granting summary judgment to defendant standard
developers or defendant inspectors of products or activities that prove injurious
have made much of the reliance requirement, finding no reliance when the pool
builder or his counterpart continued its own safety efforts, or was insufficiently
under the control of the defendant. E.g., Blessing v. United States, 447 F.
Supp. 1160, 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") had no duty to employees injured at work by
equipment that had been allegedly inspected in a negligent fashion by OSHA
because the employers were primarily responsible for maintaining the
equipment); Bailey v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 719 N.E.2d 178, 185 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999) (finding that a trade association that published recommendations for
the construction of trusses owed no duty to construction workers who were
injured when a truss collapsed because the recommendations were only
advisory and the association had no power to enforce compliance); Meyers v.
Donnatacci, 531 A.2d 398, 403-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (refusing to
impose a duty on NSPI to a pool user because NSPI did not control the seller of
pool); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(finding no duty by an association that developed standards for tire
manufacturers to the plaintiffs decedent after a tire explosion because the
standard developer did not control the manufacturer that negligently installed
the tire).
These courts are certainly correct in pointing out the standard developer's
lack of control. Suggested standards are often used merely as minimum
guidelines that third-party builders or sellers may or may not choose to adopt,
modify, or reject. Nevertheless, the approach recommended here concedes that
the developer's standard has invariably influenced the injurious product or
activity. The approach recommended concedes further that such influence,
while falling far short of control over the third-party builder or seller, has been
held sufficient to trigger the imposition of a tort duty of care on the defendant
exerting the influence, at least in other contexts. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO
Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40-41 (Cal. 1975) (finding that a radio station had a
duty to strangers on a highway when the station's disc jockey merely
encouraged listeners who it did not control to arrive quickly at a particular
location and one of those listeners caused an accident); Hyde v. City of
Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a newspaper was
liable to an assault victim for negligence for publishing the victim's identity and
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There is no analytical difficulty in applying section 324A to the
promulgation of standards. Section 324A provides a legal niche into
which the promulgation of standards conveniently fits. The court in
King reasoned that promulgating standards likely satisfied parts (b)
and (c) of 324A, but it could also have invoked part (a) on the
ground that NSPI's standard, by suggesting that a one-meter diving
board could be used in a Type Il pool, increased the risk of this
collision injury. The purpose of part (a), like that of section 324A
generally, is to identify when a defendant's behavior takes that
defendant out of the safe harbor of nonfeasance and precludes it
from invoking the "no duty to rescue rule." Behavior that cannot be
said to leave unaffected the level of risk facing plaintiff but rather
increases that risk is an example of such duty-triggering behavior. 6
Arguably, as long as the standard was in place before the building of
the pool and influenced the builder to construct a pool presenting
this collision risk, rather than a pool presenting less collision risk,
the standard could be said to increase the risk of a collision injury
like the plaintiffs. Again, the builder's testimony that he was
influenced by the suggested standard should suffice for this purpose.
But is section 324A of the Restatement (Second) an apt vehicle
for carrying such baggage? Do the policies underlying section 324A
call for imposing on standard developers a tort duty of ordinary care
to all users of products or activities that conform to their standards?
As the reporters of the Restatement (Third) emphasize, policy
concerns may call for a holding of "no duty" no matter how tight the
analytical fit between the facts and the language of section 324A."
Past cases invoking 324A seem to envision a relationship between
the defendant and the plaintiff that is much more specific and more
limiting. The volunteer-defendant in Marsalis, for example, knew
the plaintiff personally. The volunteer personally met and promised
the plaintiff-husband to contain the cat and knew the one specific
individual who might be endangered by any negligence in her
address and thus assisting an assailant in assaulting the victim). Hence, the
grounds advanced here for finding "no duty" differ.
63. King v. Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 570 So. 2d 612, 614 (Ala. 1990).
64. For a case in which section 324A(a) could not be invoked, see Patentas
v. United States, 687 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1982). There, because the Coast Guard
merely came upon the scene of a tanker explosion and was negligent in
providing aid, the Coast Guard did not increase the risk to the victims of the
explosion, and hence had no tort duty to them. Id. at 717.
65. In Comment b to section 43 of the Restatement (Third), the counterpart
to section 324A, the reporters state:
Court determinations of no duty based on special problems of principle
or policy. Even though an affirmative duty might exist pursuant to
this Section, a court may decide, based on special problems of
principle or policy, that no duty or a duty other than reasonable care
exists.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 43 cmt. b (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
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promised undertaking.6 6  Applying 324A to the volunteer in
Marsalis imposed a duty on the volunteer to one person-the
plaintiff. Moreover, the duty to that plaintiff would not last beyond
a fortnight. And because the situations to which 324A apply
usually involve some exigency, the brief duration of the duty is
another factor that limits its application.
When courts refuse to impose a tort duty, they often stress the
fear of open-ended or insufficiently limited liability.68 Applying
324A to impose a duty on standard developers whenever users of
complying products are injured brings that fear into play. While
knowing its standards would primarily be used by builders of pools,
NSPI, like other standard developers, offered its standards
generally to the world at large. The number of persons who might
read and rely on its standards was unlimited. By suggesting its
standards, NSPI did not develop a deeper, closer, or more specific
relationship with any one of those persons than with any other.
Unlike certifiers of previously produced products or models of
products, NSPI did not express a judgment about the particular
specimen of the product that proved injurious. Compared to the
standards of those who certify particular finished products, NSPI's
standards were general and forward-looking. When any
organization suggests standards for products or models of products
that are dangerous and widely used, the number of injuries
resulting from the use of products that comply with the standards is
potentially unlimited. Allowing all those injured to state a cause of
action against the standard developer merely by alleging that it was
negligent in not opting for a different standard threatens to yield
much more liability for ordinary negligence than courts should be
willing to tolerate. At least one court has recognized the
insufficiently limited liability now facing standard developers:
Here policy considerations weigh against holding the [National
Fire Protection Association], a voluntary membership
association, liable .... Promoting public safety by developing
safety standards is an important, imperfect, and evolving
process. The imposition of liability on a nonprofit, standards
developer who exercises no control over the voluntary
implementation of its standards ... could expose the
66. Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94 So. 2d 120, 122 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
67. Id.
68. Classic decisions illustrating the judicial concern for insufficiently
limited liability include Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y.
1931) and H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). See
also In re N.Y. State Silicone Breast Implant Litig., 632 N.Y.S.2d 953, 957 (Sup.
Ct. 1995) (refusing to impose a duty of care on Dow Chemical to all potential
users of silicone products because such a duty "would be indeterminate"); John
A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform,
86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1930, 1966 (1988).
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association to overwhelming tort liability to parties with whom
its relationship is nonexistent and could hinder the
advancement of public safety.
In treating the duty issue, the Restatement (Third) endorsed
this wish to avoid inviting unlimited liability." Yet when the
Restatement (Third) reporters created section 43 to update and
replace section 324(a), they cited King favorably in the Reporters'
Note to three separate comments.' First, they cited King in the
69. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. Civ.A 97-803, Civ.A
97-775, 1999 WL 508357, at *3 (E.D. La. July 15, 1999). In refusing to impose a
tort duty on the standard developer for accountants for the benefit of investors,
the Connecticut Supreme Court also cited the fear of insufficiently limited
liability:
It is not difficult to envisage the consequences that would ensue if the
voluntary promulgation of professional accounting standards were
held to impose on the [American Institute of Certified Public
Accountant ("AICPA")] a duty of care to a third party who neither is
specifically identifiable nor has any relationship with the AICPA aside
from reliance on the professional opinion of a certified public
accountant who allegedly relied on published AICPA standards. In
effect, the AICPA would be at risk of being called upon to defend its
standards in any dispute challenging the propriety of the professional
services of an AICPA member. In the face of such broad exposure, at
least to the costs of litigation and possibly to liability for damages, the
AICPA and other similarly situated professional organizations might
well curtail their laudable and salutary efforts to broaden and
strengthen professional standards. We are persuaded that this
chilling effect would benefit no one-not the members of professional
organizations, not their clients and not the public at large.
Waters v. Autuori, 676 A.2d 357, 364 (Conn. 1996).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYsicAL HARM § 37,
reporters' note to cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("Thus, Moch was
decided not on the ground of no duty to rescue but on no duty so as to avoid
excessive liability being imposed. In that respect, Moch is of a piece with other
no-duty decisions. . . .") (discussing H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159
N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1926)).
71. Section 43 of the Restatement (Third): Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm, titled "Duty to Third Persons Based on Undertaking to
Another," largely duplicates Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) and
provides:
An actor who undertakes to render services to another that the actor
knows or should know reduce the risk of physical harm to which a
third person is exposed has a duty of reasonable care to the third
person in conducting the undertaking if:
(a) the failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
harm beyond that which existed without the undertaking,
(b) the actor has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other
to the third person, or
(c) the person to whom the services are rendered, the third party,
or another relies on the actor's exercising reasonable care in the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 43 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
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Reporters' Note to comment c to illustrate Alabama's acceptance of
Restatement (Second) section 324A.72 Second, they cited King in the
Reporters' Note to comment e to illustrate that in a suit by a pool
user, the reliance by the pool builder on NSPI's standards was the
type of reliance that would satisfy the reliance requirement in
section 43's counterpart to section 324A(c)." Third, they cited King
in the Reporters' Note to comment h to illustrate that section 43
would impose a duty of care toward third parties like pool users on a
defendant like NSPI simply because of NSPI's undertaking to
promulgate safety standards for pool builders, and even though no
contract existed between NSPI and any pool builder. Necessarily
then, a third party pool user like the plaintiffs decedent in King
need not show he was a third party beneficiary of a possible NSPI
contract with a builder or installer. These three favorable
references to King suggest the Restatement (Third) reporters view
the promulgation of standards by a standard developer as a
quintessential example of an undertaking that ought to trigger a
duty of care under section 43 to those injured by complying
products. To be sure, the reporters' favorable citations of an opinion
does not necessarily express approval of the opinion's ultimate
ruling. The reporters may use the citation merely to explain or to
illustrate a principle they are embracing. Nevertheless, the
reporters' treatment of King should suppress any impulse to dismiss
King, and its threat to standard developers, as an aberration.
In one incidental respect, the Restatement (Third) limits the
liability of standard developers. For the Restatement reporters
made clear that any tort duty imposed on a standard developer must
arise under the "affirmative duties" laid out in sections 38 to 44,
rather than under the general duty provision in Restatement (Third)
section 7 . This means the Restatement reporters do not view the
promulgation of standards as itself posing a risk of physical harm to
those injured by complying products. Apparently, they view other
forces, such as the product, service, or activity itself, as putting the
injured plaintiff at risk. Hence the reporters believe that one of the
exceptions to the usual "no duty to rescue rule" must apply before
the development of standards will give rise to a tort duty. Section
37, entitled No Duty of Care with Respect to Risks Not Created by
Actor, establishes the usual "no duty to rescue rule," and sections 38
through 44 lay out the exceptions to that rule.76 The result is that-
72. See id. reporters' note to cmt. c.
73. See id. reporters' note to cmt. e.
74. See id. reporters' note to cmt. h.
75. Id. § 37.
76. Id. The exceptions are often collectively referred to as the "Good
Samaritan Rule" because they recognize a duty of care once an actor, like the
Good Samaritan, attempts to provide aid. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 664 P.2d
137, 139 (Cal. 1983) ("Also pertinent to our discussion is the role of the
volunteer who, having no initial duty to do so, undertakes to come to the aid of
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at least in the eyes of the Restatement reporters-a standard
developer, in order to persuade the court to dismiss the suit on the
ground of "no duty," need only satisfy the court that none of
exceptions found in sections 38 through 44 apply.
Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc. is the second case illustrating the
tort exposure of standard developers like NSPI." There, the
Washington Court of Appeals upheld a judgment entered on a jury
verdict for an injured pool user who also claimed NSPI was
negligent in promulgating its standards for Type II pools-that is,
residential pools with a one-meter diving board. As in King, the
pool user struck the bottom of the pool in the transition slope after
diving from the diving board. 9 The jury set the plaintiff pool user's
damages at $11 million, and that determination of damages was
also upheld on appeal.80
The trial court relied on two alternative grounds for holding
that NSPI owed the plaintiff a tort duty despite the absence of any
contact between NSPI and either the plaintiff, the builder, or the
owner of the pool." Indeed, the only contact between NSPI and the
pool in question was that the use of the particular type of diving
board in this type of pool conformed to NSPI standards.12 The trial
court's first ground was Restatement (Second) section 324A-the
ground relied on in King-and the second ground was Washington's
voluntary rescue doctrine." The appellate court agreed with the
trial court that a duty should be imposed on NSPI under
Washington's voluntary rescue doctrine and therefore upheld the
trial court's judgment for the plaintiff without discussing whether
Restatement (Second) section 324A also called for imposing a duty.
Washington's voluntary rescue doctrine did not differ from that
another-the 'good Samaritan.' He is under a duty to exercise due care. . . .").
77. Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). The more
specific theory of breach in Meneely seemed to be that the NSPI standards
negligently allowed the use of this particular type of diving board in a Type II
pool. See id. at 51, 58-59 (describing an NSPI-commissioned study that made
NSPI aware that the standards set for minimum dimensions were insufficient
to keep certain divers from impacting the bottom of a Type II pool).
78. Id. at 60.
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id. at 53, 60.
81. The contractor who installed the pool and excavated the land for the
pool was not sued. Defendant S.R. Smith, Inc., apparently a member of NSPI,
manufactured the allegedly inappropriate diving board and another defendant,
Pool and Patio Supply, sold the board to the defendant pool owner. Id. at 51.
The plaintiff stipulated before trial to the dismissal of all defendants other than
NSPI. Id. at 52.
82. In Meneely, the court admitted that the pool in question failed to
conform to NSPI standards in many respects, but held that it sufficed that the
transition slope where plaintiffs collision occurred conformed to the NSPI
standards. Id. at 59-60.
83. Id. at 57, 58 & n.4.
84. Id.
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which exists throughout the country and which is reflected in
Restatement (Second) section 323 and in Restatement (Third):
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm section 42.
Qualifications aside, the doctrine imposes a tort duty of due care on
an actor who undertakes, even gratuitously, to render services to
another which the actor should recognize are necessary for the
protection of the other. 5 The Meneely court deemed NSPI
promulgation of suggested standards as a sufficient undertaking to
trigger Washington's voluntary rescue doctrine and to impose a duty
of care on NSPI toward all users of pools that conform to NSPI
standards.86
The Meneely court reasoned that two cases applying
Washington's voluntary rescue doctrine called for imposing a duty
on NSPI. In Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc.,"' a duty was imposed on
the Washington Department of Motor Vehicles because its employee
conferred with and then negligently misled the plaintiffs real estate
broker into believing some cabins that the plaintiff later purchased
85. Id. at 55.
86. The Meneely court also made much of the NSPI continuing to use its
standard after a study it commissioned reported that indeed pool users in
complying pools were colliding with the bottom of pools. Id. at 53. While this
study confirmed the foreseeability to NSPI of such a type of injury, that was
never in dispute to begin with. Id. at 57. Ignoring the trade-offs of different
risks that the NSPI needed to face in deciding on standards, the court's
approach implied that a standard developer should not develop a standard
unless the standard guarantees that a complying product or activity will be
absolutely safe. One might think that half a century of risk-management
professionals, not to mention legal scholars, discrediting the quest for absolute
safety would have precluded the court's approach. See GuIDO CALABRESI, THE
CosT OF ACCIDENTS 3-5 (1970) (indicating the inevitable need to trade off other
values against safety); Henderson, supra note 27, at 1540 ("[Albsolute safety is
not attainable and-in any event-is not the sole desirable objective ....
Intelligent answers to the question of 'How much product safety is
enough?' . . can only be provided by a process that considers such factors as
market price, functional utility, and aesthetics, as well as safety, and achieves
the proper balance among them."); Viscusi, supra note 27, at 566 ("Tradeoffs
will and must be made."). See generally DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR
(2009) (reviewing authorities on risk management). Any standard developer for
knives or guns knows that complying products can lead to injuries to users.
Even a seemingly innocuous product like a toothpick poses a risk of harm:
"Over the next 13 years, we can expect more than a dozen deaths from ingested
toothpicks. . . ." Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1223 n.23 (5th
Cir. 1991). Apart from requiring the impossible, then, a legal approach
imposing a tort duty whenever the standard developer knows that a complying
product, service, or activity presents the possibility of an injury sends an
undesirable message to product users. That approach tells users that because
injury should be impossible as long as the standard developers acted with care
and the builders or sellers complied with the standards, the product user need
not use his own judgment to avoid injury. Against many injuries, however, the
judgment of the product user is the best precaution.
87. 545 P.2d 13 (Wash. 1975).
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were not subject to an avalanche risk." Quoting from that decision,
the Meneely court fit those facts to the voluntary rescue doctrine:
"the State's agents undertook to prevent the avalanche damage by
conferring with [the real estate broker], in effect to rescue [the
plaintiffs] from their danger, but in the process ... negligently
misled [the broker] and thus made [the plaintiffs] situation
worse."89 In the other application of the voluntary rescue doctrine,
Sheridan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,9o the Supreme Court of
Washington imposed a tort duty on the insurance company of the
Stirrat building in Seattle toward an injured employee of one of the
tenants in that building.91 The defendant insurance company had
promised its insured, the owner of the building, to inspect the
building's elevators and to file with the city a copy of the report
about the elevator, as required by a city ordinance.92 This
"voluntary assumption, as the owner's agent, of the duty of proper
inspection and reporting"93 subjected the insurance company to a
tort duty toward the tenant and its employee. The insurance
company breached that duty and contributed to the elevator's
malfunction by failing to inspect and report.94
Neither Brown nor Sheridan involved standards. Moreover, in
each of those cases, as in most voluntary rescue cases in other
jurisdictions, the defendant "rescuer" had interacted specifically
with the plaintiff, the plaintiffs agents, or the owner of property on
which the plaintiff was injured. Neither of these two cases required
the courts deciding them to confront the concern about open-ended
or insufficiently limited liability that would arise from imposing a
duty on NSPI for promulgating its standards. The Department of
Motor Vehicles employee in Brown met face-to-face with the
plaintiffs broker, knew the broker was the agent of the plaintiff, and
knew the plaintiff was inquiring about a specific property with a
view toward purchasing it. Any possible liability was closely
cabined. To impose a duty of care on the State based on the
employee's representations about the property, sound or not, created
no concern of unlimited liability. Likewise, the defendant insurance
company in Sheridan issued its promise to inspect identifiable,
specific elevators to an identifiable, specific landlord. True, the duty
imposed on the insurance company in Sheridan subjected the
insurer to liability to anyone using one of the elevators in the
building, rather than, as in Brown, to the one potential plaintiff and
88. Id. at 17-19.
89. Meneely, 5 P.3d at 55 (alterations in original) (quoting MacPherson's,
545 P.2d at 17).
90. 100 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1940).
91. Id. at 1029-31.
92. Id. at 1027-28.
93. Id. at 1031.
94. Id.
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his associates who hoped to build in the avalanche area. Still, the
defendant insurer's liability was limited to injuries caused by less
than half a dozen elevators. The small number of product
specimens 5 to which defendant's duty extended provided a natural
limit on liability. Contrast the insurer's potential exposure with
that of a standard developer whose standards fly around the
country, often around the globe, offering themselves for use by
anyone making a specimen or variation of the type of product to
which the standards apply.
Although generalizations across the wide array of products
affected by standards are treacherous, the potentially huge number
of products that a standard might affect bears on the duty issue for
two related reasons as well. In contrast to a standard developer, a
certifier who inspects, certifies, endorses, accredits, recommends, or
otherwise publicly approves a number of finished, particular
products or models of products will appear to have taken more
responsibility for the product and will more likely lead builders of
those particular products to forego their own efforts and judgment
regarding the products' safety. The builders know that the
defendant certifier has looked at and approved the specimen of the
product at which they are looking. However, when NSPI merely
suggests standards for all Type II pools, builders of the pools realize
that NSPI experts will never come by to confirm the compliance of
their particular pools to NSPI standards, or to confirm whether the
many variations the builders adopted for a particular pool have
compromised product safety. When suggested standards apply so
generally, builders of a particular specimen of the product seem
more likely to view the standards merely as helpful guidance rather
than as a reason for abandoning their own safety concerns about the
particular specimen of the product they are building.96
The potentially huge number of products that a standard might
95. The reference to "product specimens" rather than "products" aims to
remind the reader that the defendant insurer in Sheridan did not promise to
inspect all elevators of the type of those in the building in question, but only the
specific, physical, individual elevators in that building. Standard developers, in
contrast, typically concern themselves with a more general category of product,
rather than with a single specimen of the product, and hence the number of
specimens to which their duty might extend, and their corresponding liability,
could be greater by several orders of magnitude.
96. Because the builders may attach the labels of the standard developer to
finished products, which incorrectly suggest to a buyer or user that the
standard developer has indeed looked at and approved that specific specimen or
type or model, the safety efforts of buyers and users may well be as negatively
affected by the labels of the standard developer as by the labels of the product
certifier. But the builder or seller, in contrast to the buyer or user, will
nevertheless know that the standard developer has not looked at the particular
specimen, type, or model of the finished product. Thus the safety efforts of the
builder or seller should be more negatively affected by the product certifier than
by the standard developer.
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affect bears on the duty issue for another reason as well. It suggests
that the likely relationship between the standard developer and the
injured plaintiff will not be close. 7 Granted, basing "duty" on the
closeness of the relationship between the parties invites vague and
unverifiable assertions about that relationship that rarely amount
to more than conclusions. Moreover, a judicial finding of a "close
relationship" may serve merely as a proxy for a finding that no
concerns about unlimited liability arise. But if the closeness of the
relationship matters in itself, the relationship between NSPI and
the plaintiff in Meneely, for example, seems less close than the
relationship between the defendant and plaintiff in Brown or
between a product seller and its buyer or user. In one of the NSPI
cases in which NSPI prevailed, the court, in addressing the lack of a
relationship between NSPI and the plaintiff diver, described the
plaintiff "[a]s a faceless member of an unresolved class of persons
not marked by any definable limits."98  Had NSPI inspected the
specific pool involved in Meneely, it would have more actively
participated in the sale and arguably would have developed a closer
relationship with any pool user. But an organization that simply
promulgates standards for products to be used by any builder or
seller bears an undifferentiated relationship to each product user.
In this respect, the relationship between the standard developer and
the product user resembles the undifferentiated relationship
between a police force and a random crime victim who sues the
police for negligently protecting him. While other policy concerns
arise when government employees are sued, courts unanimously
refuse to impose a tort duty on the police unless prior police
behavior toward the individual plaintiff sufficiently differentiates
the plaintiff from the mass of others who might expect police
protection.99
These three policy reasons distinguish suits against standard
developers from the ever-lengthening line of successful suits against
those who have certified or otherwise inspected and approved the
very specimen or model of the injurious product.100 Rightly or
97. One could term the concern about the closeness of the relationship
between the standard developer and the injured plaintiff as a concern for
sufficient "nexus." One former, but now defunct, requirement for duty-
privity-played a similar role. See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 832
(2010).
98. Howard v. Poseidon Pools, Inc., 506 N.Y.S.2d 523, 526 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
99. See Riss v. City of N.Y., 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968) (declining to
impose a tort duty on the police to protect individuals from criminals, but
observing that "[q]uite distinguishable ... is the situation where the police
authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members of the public"); cf.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1989)
(holding that state social service agency has no duty as a matter of
constitutional law to protect specific children from third parties).
100. Some clarification is needed because occasionally the certifier will
approve not the particular specimen of the injurious product but instead the
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wrongly, courts have usually imposed a duty on such product
certifiers. This line of authority extends back at least to Hanberry v.
Hearst Corp., a case in which a tort duty was imposed on Good
Housekeeping Magazine and a jury verdict for misrepresentation
was upheld because the magazine placed its "Consumers' Guaranty
Seal" on shoes the plaintiff bought, thereby, according to the court,
warranting that the shoes were "safe."' More recently, courts have
particular type, model, or sample of that product. However, the difference
between standard development and such certification of a specified product (or
type, model, or sample of that product) remains salient. Certification involves
passing judgment on a specific design, model, or product that is already
finished. On the other hand, standard development establishes goals for
production (especially true for performance standards) and aims to assist those
who are planning to produce or are in the process of producing a product
(especially true for design or prescriptive standards). While the builder or seller
may decide on its own to attach the standard developer's label to the product,
that is often a matter of indifference to the standard developer. In contrast,
labeling and listing by the certifier constitute the heart of the certification
enterprise. There is also a conceptual difference between standard development
and certification. Standards typically describe desired designs, materials,
methods of productions, or performance characteristics of products. Standard
developers, as it were, resemble legislators who write the "statutes."
Certification typically calls for the application of those or other standards to
particular products, models, or designs. Certifiers thus resemble courts in that
they apply standards to particular cases. See generally Charles F. Rechlin,
Note, Liability of Certifiers of Products for Personal Injuries to the User or
Consumer, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 132, 133 n.8 (1970); Introduction to ANSI, AM.
NAT'L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/introduction
/introduction.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
101. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521, 523-24 (Ct. App.
1969); see also Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Control Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 1055, 1057,
1061-62 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that summary judgment in favor of an
inspection corporation was inappropriate when that corporation contracted to
provide inspection services and the injured plaintiff produced evidence that a
negligent inspection had caused his injuries); Toman v. Underwriters Labs.,
Inc., 707 F.2d 620, 620-21 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing the liability of
Underwriters Laboratories when it certified the particular product injuring the
plaintiff); Hempstead v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109, 117-18
(D. Del. 1967) (imposing liability on a testing company that approved a
particular model of fire extinguisher that exploded and injured the plaintiff);
Martinez v. Perlite Inst., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Ct. App. 1975) (finding
sufficient "minimum contacts" between trade association and the state of
California to bring the association within a California court's jurisdiction when
association disseminated information about a harmful product to several of the
association's members located in California); Michael P. Diepenbrock,
Annotation, Liability of Product Indorser or Certifier for Product-Caused Injury,
39 A.L.R. 3D 181, § 3 (1971) (collecting cases). Although the usual claim is
negligence in certification or testing, negligent misrepresentation is sometimes
alleged. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 cmt. d, illus. 8 (1965); id. §
311 cmt. e, illus. 9. Even a claim for breach of express warranty has been
advanced. See Christopher J. Clark, Comment, Potential Liability of Non-
Manufacturer Certifiers of Quality, 10 VILL. L. REV. 708 (1965) (discussing
liability of certifiers under negligent misrepresentation and express warranty
theories); Rechlin, supra note 92, at 145-47; Note, Tort Liability of Independent
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imposed a duty on the International Association of Plumbing
Mechanical Officials ("IAPMO") because IAPMO certified that
certain piping, which injured plaintiffs, complied with the IAPMO
Uniform Piping Code.1 o2  The courts in these cases typically
grounded the duty they imposed on section 324A of the Restatement
(Second).10  Certification certainly resembles standards
development in many respects, but the certifier's approval of the
particular completed specimen of the injurious product, or at least
the completed model of that product, distinguishes standards
development for the reasons stated above. That is, the certifier's
approval of an existing product specimen may reduce, at least
somewhat,'0 the fear of unlimited liability, more likely halts the
builder's own safety efforts, and establishes a closer relationship
between the certifier and the product user. These three policy
concerns blunt the precedential force of the many decisions that
impose a duty on product certifiers and justify a court faced with a
case against a standard developer in refusing to impose a similar
duty.
Having distinguished the cases against certifiers, a court
wishing to adopt the approach recommended here must still
confront the current law, exemplified by King and Meneely. Those
cases expressly impose a duty of care toward all users of complying
products onto private standard developers who do not attempt any
certification or approval of the specific injurious product. And
questioning the underpinnings of King and Meneely in no way
diminishes their threat to standard developers. There is little
Testing Agencies, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 299 (1968) (discussing both theories). But
see Benco Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 722, 786 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974) (holding that certification was not enough to trigger a tort duty to
product users).
102. See, e.g., FNS Mortg. Serv. Corp. v. Pac. Gen. Grp., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 916, 921-24 (Ct. App. 1994).
103. See id. at 918; cf Dekens v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d
699, 702-03 (2003) (applying the same rule in the context of occupational
asbestos exposure where the defendant had allegedly "undertaken to guarantee
[decedent's] safety from illness resulting from his exposure to asbestos").
104. While less open-ended than that of standard developers, the potential
liability of certifiers is still substantial. For example, in 1970, the National
Commission on Product Safety reported that the seal of Underwriters'
Laboratories, Inc. appeared on 800,000 models manufactured by 15,000
companies. NAT'L COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT PRESENTED TO THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 55-57 (1970). Other certifiers include Good
Housekeeping Institute, Parents' Magazine, Consumer Service Bureau,
Consumers' Research, Inc. (publisher of Consumer Bulletin), and Consumers
Union (publisher of Consumer Reports magazine). Id. at 66; Rechlin, supra note
100, at 144 n.45. Some certifiers, like Good Housekeeping, Inc., accept money
in the form of advertising revenue from businesses whose products they certify;
others, like Consumer's Union, do not. Rechlin, supra note 100, at 144 n.45.
Some are more likely to have 501(c)(3) status under the IRS Code than 501
(c)(6) status, the typical status of standards development organizations.
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reason to believe that future courts will dismiss King and Meneely
as deviant applications of Restatement (Second) section 324A, of
Restatement (Third) section 43, or of a state's voluntary rescue
doctrine. 0' At best, predictability is nil. Indeed, the favorable
reaction of the Restatement (Third) reporters to King suggests that
these cases herald an era of increasing liability. 06
Further support for this prediction comes from the mixed
results of suits against a much more quasi-governmental standard
developer than the purely private NSPI-the American Association
of Blood Banks ("AABB"). The more closely a standard developer is
associated with the government-that is, the more quasi-
governmental it is-the better it can wrap itself in the government's
privilege, and the stronger the case is for according it the same
qualified privilege that a government agency suggesting standards
would enjoy. Accordingly, a court that refuses to accord a qualified
privilege to a quasi-governmental standard developer would, a
fortiori, refuse to accord such a privilege to a purely private
standard developer.
In these highly publicized suits, the plaintiffs received blood
transfusions of HIV-contaminated blood. They then sued the AABB,
claiming that it was negligent in setting standards for screening
blood donors and was thus liable to the plaintiffs for their HIV
infections.'07 Unable to point to any affirmative misfeasance by the
AABB, the plaintiffs claimed its negligence lay in failing to adopt a
standard calling on blood banks to surrogate test blood donors. 08
Surrogate testing would have identified donors who were infected
with hepatitis B or with other conditions that put them at high risk
of having HIV-infected blood; those so identified would then be
barred from donating blood.' 09 The plaintiffs were able to show that
105. Cases in which courts have refused to impose a tort duty on standard
developers for the policy reasons given here include Commerce and Industry
Insurance Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. 97-803, 97-775, 1999 WL 508357, at *4
(E.D. La. July 15, 1999) (holding that the National Fire Protection Association,
which promulgates standards for construction companies, has no duty to a
building owner) and Friedman v. F.E. Myers Co., 706 F. Supp. 376, 383 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (holding that a standard developer for water pump manufacturers has
no duty to homeowners).
106. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
107. See Robert Hanley, Blood Bank Is Held Liable in AIDS Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1996, at B2.
108. See, e.g., Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks (Snyder II), 676 A.2d
1036, 1038 (N.J. 1996). Some of the cases against AABB advanced other
theories of negligence based on its standards development, such as negligence
for failing to impose a standard that would call on blood banks to offer directed
donations to transfusion patients or negligence for failing to impose a standard
that would call on blood banks to undertake direct questioning of donors. E.g.,
N.N.V. v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 889, 893 (Ct. App.
2000).
109. The surrogate test for hepatitis B was known as the "core test." The
AIDS Task Force of the Center for Disease Control viewed the core test as the
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they would not have been infected had the blood banks that were
responsible for the blood transfused into them engaged in surrogate
testing. For if the blood banks had engaged in surrogate testing,
they would have refused to take the blood of the particular high-risk
donors whose blood plaintiffs received.
On appeal, the elements of breach, cause-in-fact, and proximate
cause were assumed to be resolved in a plaintiffs favor, and the
primary issues became whether the court should impose a tort duty
on the AABB toward a plaintiff, and if so, whether the court should
accord AABB a qualified privilege that would save it from liability
as long as it promulgated its standards in good faith.' In most of
these cases, the courts imposed a duty on the AABB, rejected any
claim of qualified privilege, and affirmed the judgments against the
AABB."
Unlike the certification or inspection cases, the negligence
theory against the AABB-that their standards for blood banks
should have called for surrogate testing-raised the specter of
unlimited liability once a duty was imposed. AABB faced the
prospect of liability to every person throughout the nation and
beyond who acquired HIV from being transfused with HIV-
contaminated blood supplied by a blood bank that did not surrogate
test during the time period that the AABB standard (or lack of
most promising surrogate test, and the suits against the AABB focused on the
failure of AABB standards to call for this test. Snyder II, 676 A.2d at 1045.
Other surrogate tests that AABB standards might have called for were the T-
cell ratio test and the absolute-lymphocyte test. Id. at 1044.
110. See Id. at 1058-62 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
111. See, e.g., Douglass v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 696 So. 2d 136, 140
(La. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing summary judgment in favor of AABB); Snyder II,
676 A.2d at 1055 (affirming a jury verdict against AABB for a plaintiff
transfused with HIV-infected blood); Weigand v. Univ. Hosp. of N.Y. Univ. Med.
Ctr., 659 N.Y.S.2d 395, 400 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (imposing a duty on the AABB to a
plaintiff transfused with HIV-infected blood); cf. Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross,
848 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (finding that a reasonable jury could
find the American Red Cross dilatory in its standards relating to blood
transfusions); United Blood Servs., Div. of Blood Sys., Inc., v. Quintana, 827
P.2d 509, 525 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (observing that blood-banking standards
were insufficient and that blood center's compliance was "not conclusive proof"
of reasonable care); Gilmore v. Mem'l Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr., 607 N.Y.S.2d
546, 550 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (same); Doe v. Univ. Hosp. of the N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr.,
561 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (imposing a duty on a hospital to a
plaintiff transfused with HIV-infected blood). But see Hoemke v. N.Y. Blood
Ctr., 912 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for a
hospital in a suit by a plaintiff transfused with HIV-infected blood); N.N.V. v.
Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 889 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no
duty imposed on AABB to a plaintiff transfused with HIV-infected blood);
Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 104 (Ct. App. 1992)
(finding a blood bank not negligent for failing to screen blood donors adequately
when the court observed that the blood bank was "doing as much if not more in
the areas of testing and screening than any other blood bank in the country").
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standard) about surrogate testing operated."' That time period
itself provided a de facto limit on the number of suits because
AABB's negligent failure to call for surrogate testing lasted only
from January 1983 until March 1985, when the Food and Drug
Administration approved a blood test for AIDS now known as
ELISA."3 Another de facto limit arose from the transmission rate
for HIV, which at the time was estimated to be between 1 in 1000
and 1 in 20,000 transfusions." 4 Nevertheless, these suits imposed a
tort duty on the AABB to all those affected by a product, service, or
activity for doing no more than what every standard developer does:
promulgating standards that may influence the supplier of a
product, service, or activity and that therefore may affect the
product, service, or activity offered. The courts' rulings for the
plaintiffs in these cases imposed a duty on the AABB despite the
absence of any relation between the AABB and the blood that was
injurious to the plaintiffs--other than the fact that the AABB's
standards influenced the particular blood bank's decision not to
engage in surrogate testing of donors.
In Snyder II, the leading decision for the plaintiffs, the New
Jersey Supreme Court imposed a duty on the AABB by relying
heavily on factors increasingly deemed relevant not to the issue of
duty, but to the issue of breach. For instance, the court relied
heavily on the obvious foreseeability of injury to blood recipients
from the AABB's decision against a standard calling for surrogate
testing.115  At the time of that decision, the AABB knew of the
evidence showing that HIV-infected blood could transmit the
virus."' Indeed, the issue then under discussion at the AABB was
what to recommend in light of this knowledge.117  But the court
found that this knowledge of the evidence about how HIV might be
transmitted sufficed to render the plaintiffs infection a foreseeable
result of the AABB's standard development, and to satisfy fully
whatever importance the factor of foreseeability played in
determining duty. 118 That the evidence of transmission-related HIV
was inconclusive at the time was irrelevant; as the court held, "The
112. The AABB inspected and accredited blood banks, including the specific
bank that supplied the blood to each plaintiff, and on that ground could be
deemed a certifier or inspector, even though it never approved the particular
blood that injured the plaintiffs. Snyder II, 676 A.2d at 1048. But the opinions
imposing a duty on AABB make clear that its standard development alone
triggered a tort duty of care, regardless of any inspection, accreditation, or
follow-up. See id. at 1048-54; Weigand, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
113. ELISA is an acronym for the "enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay"
screening test. See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 860 (8th Cir.
1989).
114. N.N.V., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894.
115. Snyder II, 676 A.2d at 1048-49.
116. Id. at 1049.
117. Id. at 1044-48.
118. Id. at 1048-49.
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foreseeability, not the conclusiveness, of harm suffices to give rise to
a duty of care.""'
However important a role foreseeability has played in shaping
the duty issue as a historical matter, some courts and the
Restatement (Third) now reject foreseeability as a factor in
determining duty.'20  Because foreseeability often determines
whether a defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances, it
bears on the issue of breach. And yet the issue of breach is reserved
for the jury and necessarily involves an inquiry into the specific
facts of an individual case. 121 The jury's role is undermined if courts
assess foreseeability in determining the existence of duty as a
threshold issue.122 Reliance by courts on notions of foreseeability
may also obscure the factors that actually guide-or, in the
Restatement's view, should guide-courts in imposing tort duties.
Rejecting foreseeability as a factor then better respects the jury's
role and compels courts to articulate more clearly the policy factors
that support their duty or no-duty determinations.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also based its imposition of a
duty on the unquestioned severity of becoming infected with HIV.
As with foreseeability, courts have historically found the severity of
the injury risked by a defendant's negligence to be a factor in
assessing duty.2 2 But again, the Restatement (Third) conspicuously
omits the severity of injury as an appropriate factor in deciding duty
and strongly suggests that the severity of injury is better treated as
119. Id. at 1049. Insofar as "foreseeability" is a factor, the court was surely
correct in finding that the AABB could foresee plaintiffs harm in deciding not to
recommend surrogate testing.
120. E.g., Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 231 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (rejecting foreseeability as a factor in determining
duty). See generally W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New
Version of Duty and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts, 58 VAND. L. REv. 739 (2005).
121. See, e.g., Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670
(N.Y. 1980) ("Because questions concerning what is foreseeable and what is
normal may be the subject of varying inferences, as is the question of negligence
itself, these issues generally are for the fact finder to resolve."). Foreseeability,
of course, also plays a role in determining proximate or legal cause. See Cardi,
supra note 120, at 758 (noting that in the past foreseeability has made a dual
appearance on duty and proximate cause). Because the standard developer
certainly foresees that a builder or equipment-supplier might comply with its
standard, and because the standard developer has typically considered the risk
that materialized in the plaintiffs injury when it developed the standard, the
plaintiff should have no difficulty showing foreseeability.
122. W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
671, 729 (2008).
123. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293, 299 (1st Cir. 2002)
(applying the "severity of the risk" analysis to the context of a physician's duty
to disclose treatment risks).
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part of the breach issue.'24 Doing so effects no change in the law
pertaining to breach, as the Learned Hand calculus for breach has
long incorporated the severity of the injury as the L in its calculus.
That well-known calculus calls for finding breach when B (the
burden of precautions) is less than P (the chance of injury)
multiplied by L (the severity of the injury).125
The final factor the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized in
imposing a duty was the great influence of AABB standards on the
behavior of the member blood banks.126 About that influence, and
the influence of standard developers generally, there is again no
doubt.'27 This Article concedes that plaintiffs can invariably show
the product, service, or activity in question was influenced by a
defendant standard developer's standards. What the New Jersey
court failed to appreciate was that such influence is entirely
appropriate, considering AABB's ex ante perspective, its experience,
information, expertise, collective judgment, and reputation for
possessing these attributes among others in the industry. Indeed,
the wealth of know-how that lies behind the standard developer's
judgment is the very reason the government often incorporates a
developer's standards wholesale into regulations. Yes, standards
development organizations sometimes develop standards in an
environment of high stakes. The question that remains is whether
they should be exposed to tort liability when the fact-finder deems
them guilty of ordinary negligence in doing so.
124. The Restatement (Third) asserts that the duty issue should turn on
such policy factors-applicable to categories of actors or patterns of conduct-as
the overall social impact of finding a duty, social norms about responsibility,
relational limitations, proof problems (especially in ascertaining cause-in-fact),
concerns of institutional competence, the need to defer to the discretion of other
branches of government, and concerns with unduly open-ended and
insufficiently limited liability. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LiAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmts. a-o (2010).
125. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
126. Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks (Snyder II), 676 A.2d 1036, 1050
(N.J. 1996).
127. An inevitable result of standards being influential is that those who do
not comply with the standard suffer some stigma, loss of trust, or other
competitive disadvantage. For many decades U.S. courts in antitrust cases
made much of the competitive disadvantage that noncompliers suffer. See, e.g.,
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658-60
(1961) (holding that a standard developer, gas utility companies, and rival
burner manufacturers could potentially be liable for treble damages for
adopting a standard that put the plaintiffs burner at a significant competitive
disadvantage). Recent antitrust cases, as well as the Standards Development
Organization Advancement Act of 2004, focus more on the harm to output and
to consumers generally than on the disadvantage to noncompliers. See Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-
95 (1985); Robert Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless Concept:
'Group Boycott," 39 VAND. L. REV. 1507 (1986) (reviewing the pre-1985 law).
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II. THE SOCIAL VALUE OF STANDARDS
Compared to the courts of other common-law countries, U.S.
courts view private standard developers inhospitably.128 In general,
U.S. courts react more unfavorably to private organizations engaged
in what is loosely called industry self-regulation, using the term
"regulation" not in the narrow sense of regulation backed by the
force of law, but in the broader sense, which includes suggestions
and other informal attempts to influence the behavior of the
organization's members. When the standards of those organizations
directly or indirectly disadvantage or injure others, U.S. courts are
far more likely than English courts, for example, to come to the aid
of the disadvantaged and impose liability on the organization,
whether on the ground of tort or antitrust."'9 The English courts, in
contrast, label such purely private organizations "domestic
tribunals" or "semi-public tribunals" and respond to them with
deference, tolerance, and gratitude for the important and necessary
work these organizations perform. 30 In general, the English courts
128. See Robert Heidt, Populist and Economic v. Feudal: Approaches to
Industry Self-Regulation in the United States and England, 34 McGILL L.J. 39,
48-57 (1989) (comparing the American and English approaches). A number of
Supreme Court opinions illustrate the tendency of U.S. courts to look on
standard development with a jaundiced eye. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) ("Agreement on a product
standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or
purchase certain types of products. Accordingly, private standard-setting
associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny."); Am. Soc'y of
Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982) (observing that
a standards development organization "can be rife with opportunities for
anticompetitive activity" and that its agents had "an opportunity to
harm .. . competitors through manipulation of [association] codes"); Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941) (expressing
concern that all industry self-regulation intrudes on the domain of courts).
129. One tort-related concern is that the standard, by being set unduly low,
will help complying industry members defend against negligence and product
liability suits. Compliance with standards, like compliance with industry
custom, may provide evidence helpful to defendants in such suits, but it is never
a defense. New Eng. Coal & Coke Co. v. N. Barge Corp. (The TJ Hooper), 60
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (allowing the jury to find negligent a defendant
who complied with industry custom). U.S. courts thus deem industry standards
unworthy to set the test for negligence and yet important enough, when they
create an unreasonable risk of harm, to warrant liability.
In its decade-long investigation of standard development, the FTC voiced a
concern that courts have yet to appreciate-the potential delay in updating
standards with a resulting freeze in innovation. See FTC, STANDARDS AND
CERTIFICATION, PROPOSED RULE AND STAFF REPORT 54-63 (1978). Subjecting
standard developers to tort liability should a fact-finder deem its standards
negligent is likely to increase this delay.
130. E.g., Nagle v. Feilden, [1966] 2 Q.B. 633 at 645; Russell v. Duke of
Norfolk, [1949] 1 All E.R. 109 (Civ) 118. The rationale for the more hostile
treatment of standard development at the hands of U.S. courts remains
uncertain. Among the reasons suggested is the long tradition of judicial
deference to guild rule in England compared to the judicial determination to
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distinguish less sharply, and much less passionately, between
mandatory regulation duly authorized by statute and performed by
a public body, on the one hand, and regulation by a purely private
organization acting merely under industry custom, on the other.131
Of course, if U.S. courts accorded private standard developers the
same treatment they accord government regulators, private
standard developers would enjoy an unqualified privilege against
tort suits by persons injured by complying products or activities. In
refusing to review a private sporting association's adverse action
against the plaintiff member, an English court's language reveals
the deference shown such private organizations there:
There are many bodies which, though not established or
operating under the authority of statute, exercise control, often
on a national scale, over many activities which are important
to many people, both as providing a means of livelihood and for
other reasons.
I think that the courts must be slow to allow any implied
obligation to be fair to be used as a means of bringing before
the courts for review honest decisions of bodies exercising
jurisdiction over ... activities which those bodies are far better
fitted to judge than the courts.... Bodies such as the
[defendant] which promote a public interest by seeking to
maintain high standards .. . ought not be hampered in their
work without good cause.
Congress too tends to appreciate standard developers more than
do the U.S. courts. Congress most recently recognized the social
value of standard development when it passed the Standards
Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 ("SDOAA"). 33
suppress vigilante rule-specially as represented by the Ku Klux Klan-in the
United States. See Heidt, supra note 128, at 48-54.
131. Although this usually means less liability for a private organization in
England, occasionally this equivalent treatment means more liability. For
example, a private trade association whose treatment of a plaintiff member
arguably offends the plaintiffs "right to work" is as likely as a public agency to
be told by an English court that it must provide the plaintiff a hearing. Regina
v. Gaming Bd. for Gr. Brit., [1970] 2 Q.B. 417 at 429-32 (observing that an
association action that threatens the "right to work" triggers a right to a fair
hearing); Faramus v. Film Artistes' Ass'n, [1963] 2 Q.B. 527 at 540, 546-48.
132. McInnes v. Onslow-Fane, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1520 (Ch) 1527, 1533.
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306 (2006). For the legislative history, see H.R.
REP. No. 108-125 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 609, 609-18. Other
statutory provisions acknowledging the value of private standard development
include 15 U.S.C. §§ 271-272 (2006), which established the National Institute of
Standards and Technology ("NIST") and charged the NIST with creating an
"implementation plan" for the coordination of public and private standards; and
15 U.S.C. § 278g-3 (2006), which established a computer standards program to
be implemented by the NIST. The National Cooperative Production
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Although the Act addressed the standard developer's antitrust
rather than tort exposure, the legislative history demonstrates that
the Act sought to "encourage the development and promulgation of
voluntary consensus standards by providing relief under the
antitrust laws to standards development organizations with respect
to conduct engaged in for the purpose of developing voluntary
consensus standards.. . ."" The Report of the House Judiciary
Committee provided the relevant background:
Standard development organizations play a pivotal role in
promoting free market competition.
Beginning in the 1990's, Congress concluded that
government could no longer keep pace with rapid technological
and market change, and that government-directed standard-
setting activity was often cumbersome, duplicative, and
inefficient. To address this concern, Congress passed the
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
("NTTAA"). NTTAA's express goal was to . .. assist in the
development of voluntary consensus standards and to adopt
such standards in favor of often outmoded government
standards whenever possible. While the NTTAA succeeded by
almost every measure, [standard development organizations]
continue to be vulnerable to litigation even after its passage. 135
When the possible tort liability of standard developers has been
Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat.117, amended the National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815, by
renaming it the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993
("NCRPA") and extending its provisions to cover joint product ventures,
including informal standard developers or consortia. The SDOAA extended the
provisions of the NCRPA to formal standard developers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-
4302.
134. H.R. REP. No. 108-125, at 1 (2003). The SDOAA required that
standards development organizations be accorded rule-of-reason analysis under
the antitrust laws, rather than the more severe per se analysis. 15 U.S.C. §
4302. It also eliminated the threat of treble damages for specified standard
development activity and provided for the recovery of attorney fees by
defendant standard developers when they prevail. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303-4304.
The Act also encouraged disclosure and discussion of intellectual property
rights and licensing terms during standard development proceedings. See H.R.
REP. No. 108-125, pt. 2 (2003). Despite the SDOAA, the mere possibility of an
antitrust challenge, even under the rule of reason, inhibits many standard
developers from allowing pre-adoption discussions among rivals about license
terms or royalty rates. Yet these discussions would serve the salutary purpose
of avoiding later strategic claims of infringement from patentees whose patents
are incorporated in the standards. See generally Patrick D. Curran, Comment,
Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70
U. Cm. L. REV. 983 (2003).
135. H.R. REP. No. 108-125, at 3-4 (citations omitted). The NTTAA was
passed as Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1995).
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brought to Congress's attention, Congress has invariably opted
against liability and provided the standard developers some
privilege. The treatment recently accorded the facility-security
standards of ASIS International, a standard developer for security
professionals, offers an example. In the SAFETY Act of 2002, 136
Congress authorized the Department of Homeland Security to
"designate" the standards, including those of ASIS International.m'
That designation:
(2) .. . limits ASIS' liability for acts arising out of the use of
the [ASIS] standards and guidelines in connection with an act
of terrorism, and
(3) ... precludes claims of third party damages against
organizations using the standards and guidelines as a means
to prevent or limit the scope of terrorist acts.'
Congress has also acknowledged the elaborate procedures
through which private standard developers normally produce their
standards. The model set of procedures was first adopted by the
private ANSI, 39 and is referred to either as the ANSI Canvass
Method or as the ANSI Research Protocol.' The goal of these
136. Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technology Act of 2002,
6 U.S.C. §§ 441-444 (2006).
137. See id. §H 441(b), 443.
138. ASIS INT'L, FACILITIES PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES ASIS GDL FPSM-
2009 GUIDELINE, at i (2009), available at http://www.peaceatwork.org/resources
/ASISFacilitySecurityGuidelines-2009.pdf.
139. The ANSI is the central, private body responsible for the identification
of a single, consistent set of voluntary standards in the United States. It aims
to identify the need for standards and to then provide a set of standards that
are without conflict or unnecessary duplication in their requirements. ANSI is
the U.S. member of nontreaty international standards organizations such as the
International Organization for Standardization. As such, ANSI coordinates the
activities involved in U.S. participation in these groups. See Introduction to
ANSI, Am. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., http://ansi.org/about~ansilintroduction
/introduction.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). Most, but not all,
standards development organizations support ANSI and seek ANSI approval of
their standards. Among those seeking and obtaining ANSI approval was the
NSPI. In following the ANSI Canvass Method to develop the standards
condemned in King and Meneely, the NSPI called for public review and
comment on successive drafts by a wide variety of interest groups including the
American Red Cross, the National Safety Council, the American Public Health
Association, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, plaintiffs' lawyers,
and experts active in swimming pool litigation. See Standards News: APSP
Standards Consensus Committee Convened, ASS'N OF POOL & SPA PROF'LS,
http://www.apsp.org/Public/GovernmentRelations/Technical-Standards
/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (noting that the APSP has "reaccredited its
procedures with American National Standards Institute").
140. See AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., ANSI PROCEDURES FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND COORDINATION OF AMERIcAN NATIONAL STANDARDS, at iv, 1
(2001), available at http://www.aiim.org/documents/standards
/ansprolive401.pdf; see also AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL
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procedures is to assure that the process of developing standards
adheres to principles of openness, voluntariness, balance,
cooperation, transparency, and lack of dominance."' The goal of
"lack of dominance," for example, is described as follows: "The
standards development process shall not be dominated by any single
interest category, individual or organization. Dominance means a
position or exercise of dominant authority, leadership, or influence
by reason of superior leverage, strength, or representation to the
exclusion of fair and equitable consideration of other viewpoints.,,1
42
In the 2004 SDOAA, Congress required that in order to enjoy
the protections of the Act, standard developers must follow
procedures that closely track the ANSI Canvass Method.' 4  These
elaborate procedures contradict the populist image of industry
leaders manipulating the standard developer into suggesting
standards that will entrench the leaders at the expense of more
efficient innovators and of the public.
The ANSI procedures call for eliciting the views of all interested
parties before any standard is proposed, forbid any single interest
group from constituting a majority of any body dealing with
standards, require wide distribution of a proposed standard followed
by a lengthy period for public comment, insist that a record be made
of any objections, and further insist that a single such objection
automatically reach the eyes of the ANSI Board of Standards
Review.'" All standards development organizations who wish their
standards to be acknowledged as ANSI standards must follow these
procedures.'4  To be sure, saying the standards are arrived at by
"consensus" may mislead. Consensus does not mean that everyone
agrees on the standard. It merely means that the standard was
agreed upon by something more than a simple majority of the voting
REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL
STANDARDS (2010) [hereinafter ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS], available at
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American
%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2010
%20ANSI%2OEssential%20Requirements%20and%2Related/2010%20ANSI
%20Essential%20Requirements.pdf (outlining various ANSI procedures).
141. See ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 140, paras. 1.0-.10.
142. Id. at para. 1.2.
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a)(2), (b), (c) (2006). Enforcement of these
procedural requirements was assigned to the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB"). See OMB Circular A-119: Federal Participation in the Development
and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment
Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8546 (Feb. 19, 1998). On its own accord, the OMB
has shown the executive branch's appreciation of private standard development
by directing agencies to adopt private standards into law "whenever practicable
and appropriate," in order to "eliminateI] the costs to the Government of
developing its own standards." Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, Notice of
Implementation, 58 Fed. Reg. 57,643, 57,644-45 (Oct. 26, 1993).
144. AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., supra note 1, at paras. 1.2, 1.2.7, 1.3.1.
145. Id. at para. 1.1
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group, whose members were selected by the standard developer
itself. Moreover, while outside entities are encouraged to comment
on proposed standards, they are only allowed to vote if the standard
developer appoints them to the voting group.146
Of all the types of industry self-regulation, standard
development may provide the greatest social value. Standards
supply the technical foundation for transactions involving complex
goods, services, and activities. Standards facilitate communication
between sellers and buyers; transfer technology; achieve efficiencies
in design, production, and inventory; and promote
interchangeability of products and components. Standards usually
represent the distillation of a large body of technical facts as well as
a collective judgment about the pertinent goods, services, and
activities. They tell what is important about them, how they must
be produced or carried on, how to test them, and how to evaluate the
test results. The particular utility of a standard arises from
providing this complex information in a form useful to those who are
not experts on the goods, services, or activities.1 4 7
To illustrate the information efficiencies of standards, a buyer
who is not informed about a product's safety or performance
characteristics, and who cannot evaluate them by casual inspection,
may be helped to make a satisfactory choice by referring to a
product standard. Consumers buy motor oil simply by asking for
their "standard" grade. A manufacturer using standards could
produce a quality product without being an expert regarding the
underlying chemical, metallurgical, or other properties of the
materials used. This is possible because the technology or activity
in question has already been evaluated by persons who participated
in development of the standard. The standard codifies their
judgments as to "acceptable" attributes of the good, service, or
activity. Builders, buyers, and others who use the standard to
evaluate product acceptability are able to adopt these judgments
without repeating the evaluation process. Standards are especially
valuable as the level of technology rises and government entities
become less able to keep up with industry change: "For a mass
society in an era of accelerating scientific and technical change,
standards are the stabilizing, the protective factor. Without
standards there would be technological chaos; without standards the
user would be unprotected."'4
146. See id. at Annex A, paras. A.5.3-.4.
147. Leaving each individual business to devise standards on its own would
not serve consumers. With unpooled resources, the individual business would
often be unable to devote the resources necessary to investigate health and
safety issues. See Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478,
487 (1st Cir. 1988).
148. LAMB & SHIELDS, supra note 7, § 5.1, at 75 (quoting John F. Kincaid,
former Assistant Sec'y of Commerce for Sci. & Tech., Address Before the
National Electrical Manufactures Association (Nov. 14, 1967)).
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As the social value of information flow within an industry is
generally better appreciated, the social value of standards as
facilitators of that information flow should become better
appreciated as well."'9 Michael Porter, in The Competitive
Advantage of Nations, suggests how standards may contribute to
innovation. He emphasizes the importance of "industry clusters" in
which groups of domestic rivals are integral to the rapid interfirm
diffusion of product and process innovations.' In discussing
Porter's work, Professor David Teece identifies professional and
trade associations as key facilitators of this information flow partly
because of their provision of complementary standards:
[These] standards are essential if products and their
complements are to be used in a system. Computers need
software, compact disc players need compact discs, televisions
need programs, and bolts need nuts. Compatibility standards
define the format for the interface between the core and
complementary goods, so that, for example, compact disc
players from any manufacturer may use compact discs from
* 151
any music company.
Teece proceeds to identify a closely related advantage of standards:
The advantage of a standard is that the greater the installed
base of the core product, the more complementary goods are
likely to be produced by independent vendors, in turn
increasing demand for the core good. In the compact disc
example, the more households that have disc players, the more
titles record companies are likely to publish on compact disc.
The same mechanism applies when the complement is a
service, such as a maintenance network for aircraft, or when
the complement is other users of the same product, as with a
telephone network.
In each case the demand for the core product increases the
larger the base of products using the same standard. The
standard increases the total market for the product because it-
enables network externalities to be enjoyed.
149. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 143-
44 (1990). See generally Teece, supra note 8.
150. PORTER, supra note 149, at 152, 283, 665. The information exchange
need not dull competition. As Porter writes, "[when] the exchange and flow of
information about needs, techniques, and technology among buyers, suppliers,
and related industries ... occurs at the same time that active rivalry is
maintained in each separate industry, the conditions for [national] competitive
advantage are the most fertile." Id. at 152.
151. Teece, supra note 8, at 473-74.
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The advantages to society associated with the widespread
adoption of common standards can be very large, as network
externalities are often considerable.15 2
Establishing common standards requires a great deal of
communication and coordination.13 Private standards development
organizations serve as forums for providers and users to educate
each other and to discuss and plan the creation of systems of
compatible components. The standards that emerge can also serve
as a focal point for designers who must choose among many
technical solutions when embedding a standard in a component
design. 54
152. Id. at 474-75.
153. While suggesting standards provides more benefits than merely serving
as a clearinghouse of information, the value of rivals sharing information about
their products or services should not be ignored. For a discussion of the benefits
of sharing information, see generally John Han, Comment, Antitrust and
Sharing Information About Product Quality, 73 U. Cm. L. REV. 995 (2006). The
author of that article contends that such sharing may minimize over- and
under-investment and better tune operations to supply and demand than might
otherwise be the case. The author offers this example:
Suppose a firm has the task of estimating some parameter of great
importance, such as future demand [or] the weather .... The statistic
of interest is quite uncertain. Each firm in the industry has some
separate foundation for estimating its value. By sharing such
imperfect knowledge, firms in an industry are likely to increase the
accuracy of their judgments. . .. With better estimates of uncertain
common values, operations and investments can be scheduled more
confidently and efficiently, thereby lowering long-term costs.
Id. at 1009-10 (quoting Teece, supra note 8, at 479).
154. The effect of standards development organizations on output is of
course an antitrust concern, not a tort concern. But that effect is ambiguous
even when actual standardization occurs. Teece, supra note 8, at 479. After all,
product standardization facilitates achieving economies of scale in production.
Whether standardization increases or decreases output depends on whether
competition is primarily quality-based to begin with. That is, whether
standardization on balance increases output depends on a trade-off between
economies of scale in production (or the cost of producing design variants) and
the level of market demand for improvements (or the benefit of producing
design variants). As Professor Kevin Lancaster has stated:
If there are no economies of scale associated with individual product
variants ... then it is optimal to custom produce to everyone's chosen
specification. If there is no gain from variety and there are scale
economies, then it is clearly optimal to produce only a single variant if
those economies are unlimited, or only such variety as uses scale
economies to the limit ... . Most cases involve a balance of some
variety against some scale economies ....
Kevin Lancaster, The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey, 9 MARKETING
Scl. 189, 192 (2000); see also E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and
Public Policy, AM. EcoN. REV., May 1950, at 85, 89 ("[Ulnless it can be shown
that the loss of satisfaction from a more standardized product ... is less than
the gain through producing more units, there is no "waste" at all, even though
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Because a standard can provide a benchmark, standards also
facilitate and support the benefits of benchmarking. Benchmarking
is the process in which a company learns and then mimics the
techniques of its superior-performing peers to enhance its own
efficiency.'"' Benchmarking galvanizes companies to compete once
they recognize what rivals are doing, how far behind they are, and
what they can do to improve. It helps underperforming peers to
catch up. And realizing that the promulgation of the standard will
now tend to close the gap with its inferior rivals, the superior firm
gains more incentive to refine its processes further, whether in
management, manufacturing, research, or development. This will
affect the next round of standard development and then the process
begins again.
The social value of developing standards far exceeds the social
value of merely providing a forum for discussion for experts in a
standard developer's field. "6  The need to decide on a standard
every firm is producing to the left of its minimum point.").
Markets for physical products with dominant designs by definition possess
high-scale economies and low market demand for improvements. With such
products, standardization is typically procompetitive. Taking advantage of
scale economies increases output by lowering the cost of production. At the
same time, standardization does not reduce output because the market does not
demand much "improvement." Standardization in these markets increases
price competition without reducing quality competition. See JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 286 (1988) (stating that the optimal
degree of product design variety is low for markets in which there are
economies of scale in production and a dominant design); see also Tag Mfrs.
Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 463, 465 (1st Cir. 1949) (finding procompetitive the
standardization of tag manufacturing). Standardization can also make
previously differentiated products more comparable, thereby reducing buyer
search costs.
In addition, standardization can take advantage of a dominant design that
accounts for most of a market's demand and of positive externalities between
firms. Information advertising and public research conducted by one firm
benefits other firms that produce according to the same standard. But
advertising has an ambiguous effect on competition. It can either increase
demand elasticity by showing similarities between products or decrease demand
elasticity by particularizing buyer preferences. See E. Thomas Sullivan, On
Nonprice Competition: An Economic and Marketing Analysis, 45 U. PITT L. REV.
771, 798-800 (1984).
155. See Teece, supra note 8, at 477.
156. As the National Marrow Donor Program explained in its amicus brief
opposing the imposition of tort liability on the American Association of Blood
Banks:
A standard setting body, such as the AABB, provides an arena in
which researchers can and do come together to focus on the state of
scientific knowledge. The standard setting process thus imposes a
certain discipline and coordination to what would otherwise be
independent research going on in many places at the same time.
Without this arena or this discipline, there are only scholarly articles
going back and forth in various journals that are then individually
analyzed and responded to months later by other researchers.
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forces the members of the standards development organization, each
of whom may have relevant information about some aspect of the
matter at hand, to focus on the implications of their learning instead
of merely sharing their learning.1 7  The standard development
process coordinates the learning of the members and pushes that
learning to resolution, if only in the form of suggestions. In a sense,
the standard development process provides for the industry what
the Restatement process provides for the common law. It represents
an attempt to summarize, translate, and resolve different points of
information that develop over time, like different case outcomes,
into the directions and generalizations that will be most helpful to
experts and nonexperts alike. Subjecting trade associations to
potential liability when they go beyond information-sharing and
attempt to develop a standard would deprive members, consumers,
and the community-at-large of a valuable resource.
Part of the social value of standard development lies in the
standards development organization's ex ante perspective. That is,
the standard developer, much like the product designer in selecting
between alternative designs, is in a position to take into account all
of the reasonably foreseeable pros and cons of alternative
standards. 58 Compared to other decision makers, the standard
developer sits on higher ground and enjoys better vision. In regard
to risks, for example, the standard developer, at least when free
from the threat of liability, can accord appropriate weight to the
entire panoply of risks presented by the product or activity,
measuring those risks by their relative probability and severity.
Unlike a judge or jury, the standard developer is not tempted to put
undue weight on the risks that materialized in the injury to the
particular plaintiff before the court.159  Assuming the standard
developer possesses at least as much information as a subsequent
court, the standards emerging from the standards development
process are hence more likely to reflect an accurate assessment of all
the risks, and an informed trade-off between them, than would any
standards suggested by a decision maker deprived of the benefits of
an ex ante perspective. Insofar as the threat of liability leads the
standard developer to place undue weight on some risks, namely,
the risks most likely to result in liability, that threat may destroy
society's best chance of obtaining its most informed assessment of
Brief of Amicus Curiae National Marrow Donor Program in Support of
Respondent at 8, N.N.V. v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 (Ct.
App. 1999) (No. D026690), 1998 WL 34113746, at *8.
157. See id.
158. See Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938,
946-47 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that courts have "little expertise" in the standard
developer's trade and it is thus infeasible to substantively review every
developer decision (citing Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 443 (2d Cir.
1969))).
159. See, e.g., Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
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the costs and benefits of alternative standards. 160
Compare the standard developer's ex ante perspective in
developing a standard with the ex post perspective of a jury that is
asked whether the suggestion of that standard constitutes
negligence. Calling the jury's perspective "ex post" means the jury
knows what has happened-that is, it knows the plaintiff has been
injured and it knows the role the product, service, or activity that
complied with the standard played in that injury. That perspective
subjects the jury to what one judge called the "hydraulic force" of the
hindsight bias.'61 For instance, the jury knows that only one of the
several risks the standard developer took into account has
materialized in the gruesome injury to the plaintiff before them.
Does such knowledge affect the jury's evaluation of the magnitude
and severity of that risk compared to that of the risks that did not
materialize? Of course, the members of the jury are told that their
knowledge of that risk materializing, like their knowledge of what
happened generally, should not affect their evaluation of the
standard developer's judgment. They are told to adopt the ex ante
perspective and impartially assess the magnitude and severity of all
risks. But an ample body of literature establishes that most people
succumb to the hindsight bias. Knowledge of the outcome
significantly increases the jury's perception of the foreseeability and
the probability of that outcome, regardless of how carefully they are
instructed to ignore that knowledge."' In cases against standard
developers, as in cases against product designers, this bias likely
manifests in jurors overestimating the risk that materialized in
plaintiffs injury compared to other, equal risks. The jurors then
tend to condemn as negligent the standard developer's more
accurate estimate of that risk, an estimate that is implicit in its
standard.
While juries retain a hallowed place in tort law, even the United
States Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that juries, as a
practical matter and however instructed to the contrary, do not
conduct the careful cost-benefit calculus called for by the risk-utility
test for design defect claims and by the Learned Hand test for
160. For discussion of the extent to which tort liability distorts standard
development, see infra Part IV and text accompanying notes 196-99.
161. Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
162. For further elaboration on this point, see Baruch Fischhoffs
experiments in the 1970s, described in The Science of Fear. GARDNER, supra
note 86, at 298 (2008). In those experiments, potential outcomes given a
probability of 33.8% before subjects knew the outcome were given a 57.2%
probability by subjects who knew the outcome had in fact materialized. And
after events occurred, subjects remembered assigning a higher probability to
that event occurring than they actually had assigned to it. When events did not
occur, subjects remembered assigning a lower probability to that event
occurring than they actually had. Id.
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negligence. In comparing the assessments of juries to the
assessments of state legislatures or regulators, the Court deemed
juries' judgments "less deserving" and recognized that the jury is
likely to accord the risk that materialized in plaintiffs injury
disproportionate weight:
A state statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency,
could at least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis similar
to that applied by the experts at the FDA: How many more
lives will be saved by a device which, along with its greater
effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm? A jury, on the
other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and
is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped
those benefits are not represented in court. 163
The Court's candor is as refreshing as its implications are dramatic.
For if the Court correctly depicts the jury's perspective when
presented with a design defect claim, then the Court has taken the
side of the severest critics of asking the jury to second-guess a
manufacturer's design decisions.164  The Court's frank admission
that juries do not apply the risk-utility test for design defects or the
Learned Hand test for negligence mocks the formal law that
supposedly governs and accuses that law of allowing virtually
untrammeled scope for jury sympathy. In effect, the Supreme Court
is saying that, however well-defined our law may be up to that point,
once negligence and design-defect claims reach the jury, lawlessness
reigns. Lower courts that are too willing to defer crucial elements to
the jury's judgment, therefore, threaten due process norms."' Such
constitutional issues need not be reached if a court-citing the
standard developer's ex ante perspective and the jury's
shortcomings-refuses, under the rubric of "no duty," to let the jury
condemn as negligent the standard developer's judgment.
The customary practice rule applied in malpractice actions
163. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (holding that federal
approval of a Class II medical device that had undergone premarket approval
by the FDA preempted state tort claims). Professor Francis Bohlen cited a
similar shortcoming of the jury nearly a century ago. See Francis A. Bohlen,
Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 118 (1924) ("The
concept universal among primitive men, that an injury should be paid for by
him who causes it ... still dominates the opinion of the sort of men who form
the average jury.").
164. See, e.g., William A. Niskanen, Keynote Address: Freedom of Contract as
Tort Reform, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 7 (1996) (noting that the extension of
strict liability to the field of design defects has "require[d] courts and juries to
second guess the product designers, the engineers and the marketing people"
and that "[sluch second guessing is difficult or impossible").
165. For a discussion of the scope of jury discretion allowed by the Due
Process Clause, see BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 575
(1996) and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
456-58 (1993).
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against professionals may reflect a similar distrust of the jury
properly determining the breach issue. This rule requires the
plaintiff to produce expert evidence and requires the jury to find
that the allegedly negligent medical professional failed to comply
with the standard of care of the profession.166 Hence the jury is not
free to deem the defendant negligent merely on finding that in its
collective opinion the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care.
This customary practice rule stems in part from the same concern
voiced throughout this Article-the reluctance to let the jury second-
guess the judgment of the more informed.
Less obviously, the customary practice rule also stems in part,
some have suggested, from fear that the jury will infer negligence
merely from the defendant making what has turned out in hindsight
to be a mistake.'67 In many malpractice actions, naturally, it is clear
that the defendant in some respect turned out to be mistaken. The
customary practice rule comes to the aid of the mistaken, but
nonnegligent, defendant by protecting him from the jury as long as
he has complied with the standard of care of the profession.168
The fear that the jury will infer negligence merely from finding
a mistake presents itself just as forcefully in actions against
standard developers as in malpractice actions against professionals.
In the blood transfusion cases against the AABB, one court based its
refusal to impose a duty, in part, on its conviction that the jury
would find AABB negligent simply because AABB's failure to call for
surrogate testing turned out in hindsight to be tragically
mistaken. 69  Yet the current law provides "mistaken" standard
developers no counterpart to the protection from a wrongful finding
of negligence that is provided to mistaken individual professionals
by the customary practice rule.
This Part has emphasized the benefit to society of the
information that standards provide. The benefit to society from
standard development resembles the benefit to shareholders of the
entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of their company's
executives. Just as the shareholders' benefit helps to justify the
"business judgment" rule, which protects the executive from liability
for shareholder losses caused by the executive's ordinary
negligence,170 the benefit to society from standard development
argues for the equally hospitable treatment of standard developers.
Courts that appreciate the informational benefit of standards and
166. See Crowe v. Marchand, 506 F.3d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2007); Allan H.
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 605-
08 (1959).
167. See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 166, at 607-08.
168. Id. at 605-07.
169. Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 866 F. Supp. 242, 247-48 (D. Md. 1994).
170. See Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 535 P.2d 137, 143 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1975).
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that realize how ill-positioned the jury is to evaluate standards
should also question the current exposure of standard developers on
those grounds alone. But the realization that standards are often
opinions, albeit highly informed opinions, about best practices or
optimal trade-offs brings into play First Amendment values and
strengthens further the case against imposing liability for negligent
standard development.
III. LIABILITY'S THREAT TO FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
Even the most devoted First Amendment fan may question the
sincerity of a standard developer who claims that imposing a tort
duty of care upon it when its standards cause physical injury would
pose a significant threat to First Amendment values. Whether they
are suggesting standards for rating the prurient content of motion
pictures, suggesting procedures for blood banks, or suggesting
practice parameters for brain surgery, standard developers deal
primarily with information, not expression, with know-how, not
ideas. Their suggestions are more akin to commercial speech' 71 and
hardly seem to implicate core First Amendment values. If anything,
resolving on a suggested standard tends to overrule more than it
tends to support deviant voices. And, of course, tort liability neither
imposes a prior restraint nor "abridges" First Amendment rights
through fines or imprisonment.172 All the same, those who would
dismiss First Amendment concerns out of hand in deciding whether
to impose a duty on standard developers should rebuke themselves.
Courts have often found that imposing a tort duty on communicators
171. Commercial speech receives less protection than do other types of
speech under the First Amendment. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (observing that commercial speech receives "a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale
of First Amendment values"); Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 770 (1976). But see Daniel A. Farber,
Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 385-
86 (1979) (questioning the distinction between commercial and political speech);
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 634-52 (1990) (disputing the grounds for distinguishing commercial
speech).
172. Modern cases, however, have expanded the notion of abridgment. See,
e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) ("Our cases teach that
the application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to
restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the
Fourteenth Amendment."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265, 276-
77(1964); cf Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)
("'[C]onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of
governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise
of First Amendment rights.'" (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972))).
See generally Susan Elizabeth Grant Hamilton, Comment, The First
Amendment as a Trade Association Shield from Negligence Liability and
Strategies for Plaintiffs Seeking to Penetrate that Shield, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
466 (2000).
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to those physically injured by their communication implicates First
Amendment values. 7 1 Indeed the range of tort cases arising from
communications in which First Amendment concerns can be
dismissed is surprisingly narrow. Professor Frederick Schauer has
attempted to describe that narrow range of cases:
[W]hen an act of communication is directed at a private
transaction and not at social change, when it is delivered face
to face or individually rather than to the world at large, when
it seeks to convey information and not argument, and when it
pertains only to topics well beyond the range of topics
perceived to involve the values of the First Amendment, then
with the convergence of all four of these factors there does not
seem to be any reason to convert what would otherwise be a
pure tort action into anything else. 174
If nothing else, Schauer's requirement that the communication be
face-to-face excludes cases related to suggesting standards from this
narrow range of cases in which First Amendment concerns can be
dismissed. Hence the extent to which imposing a tort duty on
standard developers sacrifices First Amendment values warrants
examination.
Such an examination quickly reveals that, while many
standards merely convey information, many others represent a
greater-than-majority opinion among experts about the optimum
trade-off between several conflicting goals. A standard may
announce, for instance, "Here is our opinion about the best way of
making a product or performing an activity, net of all trade-offs
between conflicting goals." Overall safety is typically one of these
goals but hardly the only one. However impressive the body of data
about risks and benefits from which the experts draw, these
173. E.g., Ginsburg v. Agora, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 733, 739-40 (D. Md. 1995)
(refusing to impose tort liability on defendants for alleged negligent
misstatements contained in an investment letter, in part based on First
Amendment concerns); Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 339-
40 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (holding that the First Amendment, among other factors,
counseled against giving a subscriber a negligence action against an online
financial service for alleged misstatements); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490
N.E.2d 898, 899-900 (Ohio 1986). Even some courts that allow plaintiffs' tort
actions to proceed in this context acknowledge that First Amendment values
support defendants. Those courts typically balance First Amendment values
against the plaintiffs' interests, and only allow the action to continue upon
finding that the plaintiffs' interests deserve greater weight. See, e.g., In re
Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 837, 842-43
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974); and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
152 (1967) in analyzing a negligence claim implicating First Amendment
values).
174. Frederick Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and the First Amendment, 47 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 161, 169 (1990).
20101 1273
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
standards turn ultimately on value judgments. These standards
then amount to informed and agreed-upon judgment calls. Like
other opinions, but unlike, say, the price of cucumbers, these
standards are not susceptible to verification. 75 Of course, one can
disagree with the standard developer's opinion. One can think his
or her standard should have called for more precautions or placed
less weight on the cost of precautions. Just so, one can disagree
with the laws that emerge from the legislative process, or from the
provisions of the Restatement of Torts. One may likewise condemn
the actual effects of those standards, laws, or provisions. But
allowing the jury to characterize the standards, laws, or provisions
themselves, or their actual effects, as "negligent" is something else
again.
Imposing tort liability whenever a jury deems the standard
developer's opinion negligent collides head-on with the protection
against tort liability that courts accord to statements of opinion
generally. When those stating an opinion are sued for defamation,
for example, courts accord the statement of opinion virtually
absolute protection, citing both the impairment of First Amendment
values if voicing an opinion triggered tort liability and the difficulty
of judging an opinion as true or false."' Yet judging a suggested
standard negligent or non-negligent, at least when the standards
are developed through compliance with the normal ANSI
procedures,' 7 seems equally difficult."'
Of all the types of speech, "how to" books most closely resemble
the suggestion of standards, at least in their usual goals. When
authors are sued for the physical injuries caused by the faulty
instructions in such books, courts have refused to impose a tort
duty."'9 As one court explained, "Were we tempted to create this
175. If some standards amounted to a guarantee against being injured while
using a complying product, perhaps those standards could be judged to be true
or false. But virtually no standards purport to give such a guarantee.
176. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 ("Under the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact." (footnote omitted)). But see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1990) (cautioning against "the creation of an artificial
dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact," but using verifiability as the touchstone
for distinguishing opinions and ideas from facts). While the fact/opinion
distinction may break down under scrutiny, it has afforded substantial
protection for literary and political criticism.
177. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
178. Admittedly, certifiers likewise offer opinions. Yet doing so has not
prevented courts from deeming them negligent and imposing liability.
179. E.g., Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that the publisher of a "how to" book on making
tools had no duty of care to prevent injuries caused by a tool that shattered
when a reader was following the book's instructions); cf Cardozo v. True, 342
So. 2d 1053, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that, "absent allegations
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duty, the gentle tug of the First Amendment and the values
embodied therein would remind us of the social costs." 80
Perhaps the best illustration of how standard development may
benefit from a wide open, fearless, and vigorous discussion was the
supposedly negligent standard development by the AABB that led to
liability in Snyder II. There, the trial court sent to the jury the
claim of the plaintiff, a recipient of HIV-infected blood, that the
AABB was negligent because its standards for blood banks, adopted
in July of 1984, did not call for surrogate testing of blood donors for
hepatitis B.' And the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld on
appeal the jury's finding of negligence and liability. 182
Implicitly then, the jury found that the AABB was unduly and
unjustifiably influenced at that time by the considerations,
introduced through the testimony of the AABB's experts, that
argued against surrogate testing. Yet a brief review of those
considerations suggests their obvious relevance and the social value
of a wide-open discussion that will put such considerations before
the standard developers. In deciding whether to adopt a standard
that called for surrogate testing of blood donors for hepatitis B, and
the consequent exclusion of those donors, the AABB needed to
consider the effect of such testing on the supply of blood. Many
individuals need blood regularly and others require it as a life-
saving measure in emergency situations. Instituting surrogate
that a [recipe] book seller knew that there was reason to warn the public as to
contents of a book," the retailer did not impliedly warrant the safety of the
recipes in the cookbook); MacKown v. Ill. Publ'g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526,
529-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (finding that a newspaper that published a reader-
submitted recommendation for reducing dandruff lacked any tort duty' to
another reader who was injured after trying the remedy, primarily on the basis
of lack of privity or direct communication); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821,
822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding no cause of action could exist under a strict
liability theory for the publisher of a science book after the plaintiff was injured
attempting to conduct an experiment). Publishing a "do-it-yourself" installation
guide for above-ground swimming pools resembles closely the behavior of the
NSPI in suggesting standards for pools. Yet when sued by an injured pool user,
the publisher of the guide prevailed on the ground of "no duty," with the court
insisting that a duty of care should only be imposed on the seller of the pool.
See Spaulding v. Lesco Int'l Corp., 451 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that the defendant, the publisher of a manual, "had no duty to warn of
the alleged dangers of another's product"), affd sub nom. Glittenberg v.
Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1992). Travel guides
also resemble standards, and courts have not hesitated to dismiss legal claims
based on these guides on the ground of "no duty." See, e.g., Birmingham v.
Fodor's Travel Publ'ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 76-77 (Haw. 1992) (holding that the
publisher of a travel guide had no duty to warn readers of dangerous conditions
on a specific beach when readers relied on the travel guide in deciding to visit
the beach).
180. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).
181. Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks (Snyder II), 676 A.2d 1036, 1038
(N.J. 1996).
182. Id. at 1055.
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testing would produce false positives in five percent of the normal
population who were not HIV infected and would thereby wrongly
exclude a half-million blood donors.'" Being told they were rejected
lest they contaminate the blood supply with HIV might inflict
emotional distress, and even panic, on these false positives, at the
fear that they had contracted HIV. Members of high-risk groups
might be drawn to blood banks under the impression that they could
then find out whether they were infected with HIV. Since the test
for hepatitis B was not completely reliable-only eighty percent of
male homosexuals with HIV would test positive'"-the net effect
might be to contaminate more blood. Moreover, there was only one
manufacturer of commercial kits to test for hepatitis B, that test had
not yet been approved by the Food and Drug Administration, and it
was unclear whether this test, even if approved, could be made
available quickly and efficiently. "5 Also arguing against surrogate
testing was a study that showed a high rate of hepatitis B in areas
with a high proportion of Chinese residents even though the
incidence of HIV in this Chinese population was low. 86 Surrogate
testing was also costly in part because it would have required
notifying people who had tested positive and doing repeated testing.
Estimates of the probability of acquiring HIV through blood
transfusions at that time ranged from 1 in 1000 to 1 in 20,000.187 By
the late 1990s, evidence had been developed to suggest that
surrogate testing would have avoided twenty-one percent of the
blood-transmitted HIV cases.'88 But up to the relevant time period,
medical studies on the efficacy of surrogate testing had yielded
conflicting results. Other organizations studying the evidence such
as the Food and Drug Administration, the American Red Cross, and
the National Institutes of Health and the Public Health Service
adopted the same position as the AABB in not recommending the
surrogate testing of blood donors until December 1984. 189 Rather, all
these organizations, from December 1982-when evidence first
arose that HIV could be transmitted through the transfusion of
blood-through March 1985-when the ELISA test for HIV became
available-called for further study, and instituted measures to
protect patients from AIDS, including recommendations about AIDS
education, self-deferral, directed donations, and screening through
medical history.'" As the Snyder II dissent noted, and the majority
183. N.N.V. v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 890-891 (Ct.
App. 1999).
184. Snyder II, 676 A.2d at 1045; see also Todd, supra note 44, at 155.
185. N.N.V., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 890.
186. Id. at 892.
187. Id. at 894.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY 77-79 (1995)
(describing the development of a screening process by the FDA).
190. Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks (Snyder II), 676 A.2d 1036, 1045,
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could hardly dispute, the AABB's decision to adopt educational
efforts and indirect donor screening instead of surrogate testing was
"the exercise of judgment or discretion in making basic policy.l91
This background is recited not to defend the AABB's decision,
but to illustrate the many matters that standard developers may
legitimately consider. To provide that consideration, a wide open
discussion untrammeled by the fear of tort liability is as appropriate
for standard developers, as it is, say, for the voting public during an
election campaign.'9 2 There is a First Amendment interest in
affording the standard developer and its members who participate
in that discussion-and in the ultimate vote on a proposed
standard-the "breathing space" that protection against tort
liability for ordinary negligence would provide. 93  Here again the
great number of possible claimants against standard developers
should a duty be imposed heightens the likely chilling effect from
liability on the developer's deliberationsl 9 4  The harm to First
Amendment values must therefore be added to the other concerns
that argue against imposing a duty, and the sum of those concerns
then laid against the gain from liability, primarily the deterrence of
negligent standard development.
1047 (N.J. 1996).
191. Id. at 1056 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quoting Costa v. Josey, 415 A.2d
337, 342 (N.J. 1980) (interpreting New Jersey's statute that supplied absolute
immunity for discretionary public functions and granting defendant a privilege
under the statute)).
192. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in contrast, suggested that the AABB
had considered too many concerns. After reviewing the concerns that argued
against surrogate testing, the court held: "These concerns .. . should not have
diverted the AABB from its paramount responsibility to protect the safety of the
blood supply. Recognition of that responsibility should have led the AABB to
consider more carefully the risks to recipients from the transfusion of infected
blood." Id. at 1050. In the court's view, apparently, a court and jury should
determine the scope of relevant concerns that the standard developer may
properly consider. Being "diverted" by other concerns is apparently evidence of
negligence. Under this framework, a member who diverts the standard
developer's attention by raising previously unconsidered concerns may thereby
increase the standard developer's tort exposure.
193. Labeling standards themselves, and the discussion leading to them, as
commercial speech does not eliminate First Amendment concerns. See, e.g.,
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62
(1976).
194. The Supreme Court has recognized that imposing tort liability may
distort discussion. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
Court held that the common law of defamation, if left unqualified, could so
distort discussion about public figures as to be unconstitutional. Id. at 279.
Such liability would deter uttering a certain assertion "even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether
it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." Id.
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IV. LIABILITY'S THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF STANDARDS
Imposing liability on standard developers to those injured by
products or activities complying with the standard not only inhibits
the discussion of possible standards, it also tends to distort the
standards themselves by putting disproportionate pressure on the
standard developers to sacrifice other interests in striving to avoid
tort liability. That is, interests that for whatever reason the
standard developer can sacrifice without fear of triggering tort
liability will tend to be sacrificed far too readily. These include, for
example, diffuse or abstract interests. In contrast, interests that if
sacrificed threaten to trigger a viable tort suit will receive
disproportionate weight and deference."' For example, standard
developers will unduly avoid standards that might inflict a well-
defined and substantial injury on an identifiable person or group.
The more well-defined and substantial the injury and the more
identifiable the victims, the more easily the injured can prove cause-
in-fact and attract an attorney who will work on a contingency fee.
For example, the AABB in the future will more readily sacrifice
interests such as its interest in maintaining the supply of blood.
However harmful it may be, an insufficient supply of blood is not
likely to produce an identifiable person or group who will sue.
Instead, the AABB will feel undue pressure to opt for a standard
such as requiring surrogate testing, albeit foolish on balance,
because failure to adopt that standard will inflict a substantial
injury-in this case HIV infection-on identifiable persons for whom
a tort suit may be a viable and practical undertaking. Indeed a tort
duty pressures the AABB to rush to adopt whatever standards will
best avoid liability lest they be deemed negligent for failure to
respond quickly enough to new information.196
In this respect the effect of liability on standard developers
resembles the effect of tort liability on members of medical peer
review groups. Medical peer review groups are typically charged
with deciding whether the performance of the doctor being reviewed
warrants the continuation of the doctor's staff privileges at a
hospital.'97  Continuing the doctor's privileges, however poor the
195. Courts have recognized that liability for negligence can distort decision
making by leading to the undue sacrifice of abstract or diffuse interests. E.g.,
Smith v. Day, 538 A.2d 157, 159 (Vt. 1987) (observing that imposing a duty of
care on a university to control the activities of its students to the extent
necessary to protect students from dangers such as shootings "would inevitably
lead to repressive regulations and a loss of student freedoms, thus contravening
a goal of higher education: 'the maturation of the students'" (quoting Baldwin v.
Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 818 (Ct. App. 1981))).
196. Imposing a tort duty will also hinder the adoption of a new standard
because plaintiffs can then argue that the adoption admits that the prior
standard was inadequate.
197. See Kwoun v. Se. Mo. Profl Standards Review Org., 811 F.2d 401, 408
(8th Cir. 1987) (discussing the purpose of medical peer review groups); Clark C.
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doctor's record and however many patients may suffer from his
future performance, did not create a significant risk of suit against
the members. Only denying privileges created such a risk. Such a
denial, after all, inflicted a well-defined and substantial injury on an
identifiable doctor with enough at stake to sue. Congress decided
this undesirable imbalance of pressures resulting from the threat of
liability called for granting the members of such peer review groups
a privilege against suit. The result was the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986.198
Congress and the courts have recognized tort liability's
tendency to distort the judgment of decision makers by distorting
the incentives the decision makers face. This imbalance lies behind
the well-known privilege public employees enjoy when they are
engaged in discretionary functions. Professor Richard Epstein
describes the policy underpinnings of that privilege as follows:
The nub of the issue lies in the implicit imbalance in the
incentives imposed on public officials if left wholly unprotected
by any immunity doctrine. Let them make an incorrect
decision and they will have to shoulder the enormous costs of
liability. Let their decisions be correct and there will be
enormous gains, which will be captured not by them, but by
the public at large. Why, therefore, should a public official
take all the risks for none of the gain? ... One way to restore
the [proper] balance would be to pay public officials enormous
sums to compensate them for the great liability risks.. . . The
other way to restore the needed symmetry between official
rewards and official burdens is to release the public official
from liability, in whole or in part. In this way the system is
brought into balance, since the official in question escapes
capturing the full gain or bearing the full loss, albeit at the
cost of individual redress for government wrongs.199
By threatening to distort standard development, a tort duty puts in
jeopardy the many goals, health and safety among them, that
standard development seeks to serve.
Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1117, 1123-29 (1986) (describing peer review organizations).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2006) (conferring tort immunity on members
of medical peer review committees). The California Legislature has also
provided immunity for members of peer review committees as long as the
members act in good faith. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.7(b) (Deering 2005); see also
Kwoun, 811 F.2d at 407-09 (conferring tort and § 1983 immunity on private
medical peer review group that conducted a quasi-prosecutorial medical
performance review).
199. Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks (Snyder II), 676 A.2d 1036, 1057
(N.J. 1996) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 878-79 (5th ed. 1990)).
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V. THE ALTERNATIVE TO "No DuTY"-A QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
Unlike public employees, however, standard developers face no
government oversight, nor risk of electoral removal, nor do they
operate under a formal commitment to serve the public interest.
Moreover, despite following ANSI protocols and procedures,
standard developers face an abiding incentive to let business
considerations and cost considerations influence unduly the
standards they suggest. Most standard developers also act as
lobbyists for their industry20-further indication that they may be
motivated by their industry's interests as well as by the public good,
and that unlike government employees, they may enjoy some
private benefit from their suggested standards. And no doubt exists
about the great influence of standard developers generally over the
products, services, and activities they address. Eliminating tort
liability altogether, then, may strike some as too sweeping an
abdication of traditional judicial oversight over influential private
behavior.
These concerns of selfish incentives, power, and lack of
oversight may call for a less sweeping approach than a rule of "no
duty" or a grant of an unqualified privilege. An alternative
approach-judicial recognition of a qualified privilege for suggesting
standards-may strike a better balance between the contending
concerns. This approach would retain a role for the jury and provide
some check against wholly abusive standard development. It would
require those injured by a product, service, or activity that
conformed to a standard to show that the standard developer acted
in bad faith in developing its standard. Courts would identify the
contours of bad faith and the evidence needed to reach the jury on
the issue on a case by case basis. While attempts to identify "bad
faith" behavior would be premature, a standard developer's
unexplained failure to follow the well-accepted ANSI procedures in
adopting a standard would certainly provide evidence against it.201
200. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 212 (7th Cir. 1983)
(observing that the American Medical Association "publishes numerous
professional journals, receives and responds to questions from the public on
medical subjects, and engages in legislative lobbying"); Lynn v. Amoco Oil Co.,
459 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1189-90 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (discussing oil industry groups
that both lobby and develop standards).
201. In her dissent in Snyder II, Judge Garibaldi also called for a qualified
privilege for standard developers that would free them from liability for
ordinary negligence but impose liability when the standards were promulgated
in bad faith. See Snyder II, 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Judge
Garibaldi proposed a test for bad faith that by focusing on the standard
developer's motive may be too open-ended and difficult to apply: "[A] qualified
[privilege] . .. imposes a sufficient check against decisions [by standard
developers] that are clearly wrong and motivated by profit." Id.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers similar guidance about what "bad
faith" might entail when it identifies how a person who enjoys a qualified
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Evidence of good faith, on the other hand, would include a standard
developer establishing that, when "faced with alternative
approaches, [it] weighed the competing policy considerations and
made a conscious choice."202
While no statutes provide a qualified privilege to private
standard developers generally, the "partial statutory immunities are
reflective of public policy and may serve as a guide to the evolution
of related common law immunities."203 The beneficiaries of these
statutory privileges are not merely judges and prosecutors, but
many wholly private actors who can point to some government
authorization for their decision making.2 04 Many courts have
acknowledged that recognition of the privilege does not depend on
the source of the decision-making power but rather on the nature of
the decision-making process.205 The decision to grant a privilege is
privilege to publish defamatory matter about another may "abuse" and thus
lose that qualified privilege. Such a person "abuses the privilege if he does not
act for the purpose of protecting the interest for the protection of which the
privilege is given." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 603 (1977). For example,
a qualified privilege regarding defamation may be created because "an interest
of the public is actually or apparently involved, and the knowledge ... of the
defamatory matter, if it is true, is likely to be of service in the protection of that
interest." Id. cmt. a. The interests of the public that warrant giving a qualified
privilege to defamers closely resemble the interest that would be served by
extending a similar privilege to standard developers.
202. Costa v. Josey, 415 A.2d 337, 342 (N.J. 1980); see also Bombace v. City
of Newark, 593 A.2d 335, 341 (N.J. 1991) (per curiam) (defining good-faith
immunity as protecting a defendant from liability when, objectively or
subjectively, the defendant acted in good faith); Bedrock Founds., Inc. v. Geo. H.
Brewster & Son, Inc., 155 A.2d 536, 545-46 (N.J. 1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs § 895D cmt. e (1977) (discussing categories of immunity and privilege).
203. Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 605 (N.J. 1994). When the attention of
Congress has been drawn to the possible tort liability of standard developers,
Congress has tended to provide a privilege. See supra note 136 and
accompanying text (discussing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technology Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441-444 (2006)).
204. See, e.g., Kwoun v. Se. Mo. Profl Standards Review Org., 811 F.2d 401,
407-09 (8th Cir. 1987) (conferring tort and § 1983 privileges on a private
medical peer review group that conducted a quasi-prosecutorial medical
performance review); Wasyl, Inc. v. First Bos. Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th
Cir. 1987) (granting privilege to arbitrators who performed quasi-judicial acts);
Bushman v. Seiler, 755 F.2d 653, 655-56 (8th Cir. 1985) (conferring tort
privilege on employee of Medicare carrier); City of Durham v. Reidsville Eng'g
Co., Inc., 255 N.C. 98, 102-03, 120 S.E.2d 564, 567 (1961) (conferring privilege
on an engineer who approved payments during construction because the
engineer was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity); Berends v. City of Atl. City,
621 A.2d 972, 981-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (providing an airline with
a qualified privilege that protected its decision to close a particular runway,
which allegedly caused the crash of a small plane).
205. See, e.g., Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d. 1205, 1211 (6th Cir.
1982); Citrano v. Allen Corr. Ctr., 891 F. Supp. 312, 318 (W.D. La. 1995).
Similarly, the Supreme Court's concern that liability would inhibit vigorous and
appropriate decision-making processes does not depend on the existence of a
grant of governmental authority. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-74
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based on a desire to protect and to encourage certain types of
decision making.206 That is, the recognition of a common law
privilege should depend on the functional comparability2 0 of the
standard developer's behavior to the behavior of those to whom the
federal and state governments have granted a statutory privilege.
Consistent with Supreme Court guidance, a court rightly
"examinels] the nature of the functions ... entrusted,
and ... evaluate[s] the effect that exposure to particular forms of
liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those
functions."208 This view mirrors the functional approach embraced
by the Supreme Court in looking both to the defendant's act as well
as the capacity in which that act was performed.
The privilege mentioned above, that provided to public officials
by the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") and its state equivalents,
is the most prominent statutory privilege. The FTCA and its state
equivalents prohibit state tort suits against the government and its
officials based on "the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function."209 This discretionary-
function exception prohibits predicating tort liability on policy-
bound decisions that require the exercise of judgment or discretion.
Standard development entails the same "type of policy-bound
decision" that the discretionary-function exception insulates from
judicial scrutiny.21 As it does for public officials, a privilege would
allow the members of standard developers to avoid the fear and
expense of litigation and its diversion of personal energy from their
standard development responsibilities.2
Admittedly, when private standard developers are not acting
(1959).
206. Barr, 360 U.S. at 571; Costa, 415 A.2d at 343.
207. The term "functional comparability" was first used in Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976). The term was affirmed and expanded
upon a year later in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-14 (1978).
208. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). Other examples are the many statutes
referencing "good faith" that provide a qualified privilege for employers
responding to requests for information from potential employers about current
or past employees. At least twenty-nine states have adopted such statutes, and
other states recognize a similar qualified privilege by common law. This
privilege has protected employers who respond to these requests in good faith
from suits based on defamation, intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, and retaliation in violation of Title VII. See Susan Oliver,
Note, Opening the Channels of Communication Among Employers: Can
Employers Discard Their "No Comment" and Neutral Job Reference Policies, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 687, 692-94, 714-18 (1999).
210. C.R.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 1993).
211. See Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982)
(suggesting that liability for arbitrators would discourage individuals from
serving in this capacity); cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)
(noting the social costs of suits against both innocent and guilty public officials,
namely the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office).
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pursuant to any express or implied grant of government authority,
there is little precedent for recognizing a common law privilege
analogous to that created by the discretionary-function exception.
Courts have, however, invoked the discretionary-function exception
by analogy in recognizing a common law privilege for the good faith
performance of the discretionary tasks of wholly private arbitrators.
In stressing the similarity between the function of arbitrators and
judges, and the need of both for some privilege in their decision
making, courts have overlooked the absence of governmental
authorization for arbitrators.1 These courts have acknowledged
that judicial review is inappropriate for some policy-bound decisions,
however private the decision makers.21' As the function of
arbitrators resembles the function of judges, the function of
standard developers resembles the function of legislators and
administrators, both of whom, no less than judges, enjoy at least a
qualified privilege for their decision making under the discretionary-
function exception.
Of course, courts need not base recognition of a qualified
privilege for standard development upon an analogy to the
discretionary-function exception and its state equivalents. When
private behavior-however injurious to particular plaintiffs-
benefits the public, courts have felt free to grant that behavior a
qualified privilege under the common law. An example is the
qualified privilege for those who publish false and defamatory
matter in the public interest.214 The Restatement (Second) reporters
explain the balancing of interests that warrants this privilege, and
the qualification to that privilege, in language that also seems apt
for standard developers sued for personal injury:
212. See, e.g., Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d
Cir. 1990) (granting an absolute privilege for all quasi-judicial actions to
arbitrators who heard case pursuant to contractual arbitration clause); Corey,
691 F.2d at 1208-11 (conferring a privilege on private arbitrators performing
quasi-judicial duties); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 118 (9th Cir. 1962)
(conferring a privilege on an architect acting as arbitrator pursuant to contract
because the policy of judicial immunity "extends to private persons acting [as
arbitrators] in a quasi-judicial capacity within jurisdiction established by
private agreement"); Craviolini v. Scholer & Fuller Associated Architects, 357
P.2d 611, 613 (Ariz. 1960) (recognizing a tort privilege for private arbitrators);
Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63-64 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (conferring a
privilege for an arbitrator association because its members "perform with
respect to arbitrator's functions similar to those performed by the Judicial
Conference, the Administrative Boards and the Appellate Division with respect
to judges").
213. Craviolini, 357 P.2d at 613-14.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 598 (1977). As comment d to section
598 explains, "The rule stated in this Section is applicable when any recognized
interest of the public is in danger. . . ." Id. cmt. d. For a discussion of the
public interest in standard development, see supra notes 147-78 and
accompanying text.
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A conditional privilege is one of the methods utilized by the
common law for balancing the interest of the defamed person
in the protection of his reputation against the interests of the
publisher ... and of the public in having the publication take
place. The latter interests are not strong enough under the
circumstances to create an absolute privilege but they are of
sufficient significance to relax the usual standard for
liability.215
Similarly, the effect of granting this qualified privilege in modem
defamation law-requiring the plaintiff to show the defendant's
"malice"-closely resembles the proposed effect of granting standard
developers a qualified privilege in personal injury suits-requiring
plaintiff to show the defendant's bad faith:
One consequence ... is that mere negligence as to falsity,
being required for all actions of defamation, is no longer
treated as sufficient to constitute abuse of conditional
privilege. Instead, knowledge or reckless disregard as to
falsity is necessary for this purpose.216
Granting standard developers a qualified privilege under the
common law, while certainly not compelled by precedent, would then
fall well within the traditional bounds of judicial authority.
CONCLUSION
Standards development organizations seem unlikely candidates
for the sympathy of any readers, legal scholars and judges included.
The industry leaders, scholars, and scientists who develop standards
often glory in being invited to such prestigious duty. Regardless of
liability, they will likely carry on, continuing to use their know-how
and judgment to develop standards that guide others and that
lubricate the engines of production and service. Inevitably their
judgment, no less than that of the courts, lies exposed to the
unpredictability of human experience. But this Article has argued
against exposing their judgment further to a jury's condemnation as
negligent, with all that condemnation entails.
This second-guessing of a standard developer's judgment by a
jury is particularly inappropriate in the context of a personal injury
suit brought by a person injured by a product, service, or activity
that complied with a standard. In that context, not only the
standard developer but the legal process and society as a whole lose
out when juries force standard developers, deemed guilty of no more
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 cmt. d (1977).
216. Id. By modern defamation law, I mean the defamation law that has
developed in the wake of the holding in the Gertz case in 1974. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (limiting the privilege of immunity
to defamation of public figures, defined by fame or voluntary involvement in
public controversy).
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than ordinary negligence, to pay tort damages to the injured
plaintiff. The legal process loses out because asking a fact-finder
whether the promulgation of a standard was negligent-in light of
the many trade-offs inherent in opting for a standard-asks for
more than traditional adjudication can sensibly deliver. Society
loses out because even when standard development continues,
liability distorts that ex ante assessment of all benefits and costs,
and the wide open discussion of them, that ought to guide the
process of standard development. Sheltering from tort liability the
good-faith development of industry standards will help to ensure
that, undaunted by the prospect of litigation expense and potential
damage awards, private, nonprofit standard developers continue the
essential service that they are best positioned to perform.
4
